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ABSTRACT 
The analysis in this thesis supports a recommendation to 
provide Poland $ 750 mi 11 ion a year in assistance for ten 
years. This prog r am will allow the Polish go vernment the time 
required to install a democratic system with a free-market 
economy. The as si stance can be provided by either increasing 
foreign aid and private business incentives to invest in 
Poland, or by focusing the majority of the already authorized 
foreign aid for Eastern Europe into Poland, versus spreading 
it out over the entire region. 
The suggested policy could achieve the following goals: 
one, reducing Sov iet influence in Europe; two, encouraging a 
Pol ish government supportive of Amer i can foreign pol icy; 
three, preventing the growth of popular disenchantment over 
the immediate resu 1 ts of democratic refo rms. Po 1 and as a 
strong and stable nation will act as a bas ti on against any 
future Soviet at t empt to regain control of Europe. A weak 
Poland could ultimately result in a general European conflict 
and American troops being recommitted to the continent. 
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Events in Eastern Europe s i nce June 1989 have s haken, if 
not eliminated, the belief that the USSR can dominate the 
region. By forcing the Communists to abdicate thei r monopoly 
on polit i cal powe r and conduct free and democratic elections, 
the Easte r n Bloc nations have exhibited a desire t o achieve 
independence from Communist co ntrol. 
The format i o n of Solidarity in 1980, the f irst r ecognized 
opposition element in a communist country, and the election 
of Prime Min i ster Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989 confirmed 
Poland 's position as the leader in Eastern Europe's drive for 
se l f-determination. However, it remains to be seen if the 
dr i ve for complete self-determination will be reached, and if 
s o , how the rela t ionship between the East European nations, 
the Soviet Union and the West will evolve. 
Poland' s gee-strategic position, military strength, 
natural resources, and sheer territorial size make it a 
critical linchpin for the Sovie t Union, if Moscow is to retain 
contra 1 over Eastern Europe . Thus, identifying cr it i ca 1 1 inks 
allowing the USSR to dominate Po land is the f i rst step toward 
determining the possibility of continuing, 
ing, the decline of Soviet control. 
if not accelerat-
Once the dec i sive 1 inks have been 




t he lin ks 
between Moscow an d Warsaw w i 11 be presen t e d . The final 
objective is t o determ i ne if Poland can be used as a role 
mode l for develo p ing a democratic system wi t h a free market 
economy throughout the Eastern Bloc. 
Uncertainty ab out future e vents lim i ts t he scope of this 
thes i s to an al y zin g the effects in Po l and an d any possible 
policy ramif i cat i ons during the ne xt ten years. Beyond the 
year 2000 changes in governmental off i c i a l s , President Bush 
as a minimum i n 1996, precludes any reaso na ble estimates of 
acceptab 1 e po 1 icy agendas. Moscow's act ions i n Lit hua n ia 
cou l d be a n i nd ication of the limits to t he wi llingness to 
give up polit i ca l power under a "libera l " Sov iet po l it i cian , 
and Stali n , Br e zhn ev, and Khrushchev have al r eady shown what 
a "conse rv at iv e" Soviet politician cons i de r v iable opt i ons. 
B. TOPICS 
Chapte r i s an asses s ment of the r e 1 a t i ons h i p betwee n 
Poland and the Czarist Russian state that later e volve d i nto 
the Soviet Uni o n. The major thrust of t his chapte r is t o 
iden t ify key i ssu e s traditionally divid i ng Po l and and Russia. 
It is not i nt en de d to be an evaluation o f t he unalterab l e 
even t s o r dec i si on s inherited by moder n lead e rs . 
This section pr ovides the necessary back gr ound for recog-
nizing problems suppressed by the pre-So li darity Soviet 
domination of Po land. It is essential t o corr elate present 
problems, an d probl ems emerging as autonomy i s achieved from 
Sov i et domination, wi th thei r non-communist roots . Th i s 
2 
perspective is indispensable for segregating American actions 
into categories germane: first , to reducing Soviet influence; 
second, to estab 1 ish i ng a democratic system; and third, to 
ensuring regional stability. 
Chapters I I I , IV, and V provide the framework f or under-
standing the current economic, military, and political issues 
influencing the "new" Pol ish state. This examination wi 11 
assess the principle methods that have been used previously 
by the Soviet Union to ensure a dependency on Soviet supplied 
materials or support. Once the analysis has established key 
issues, three alternative scenarios will be fashioned for each 
area of investigation. 
The emphasis of this thesis wi 11 be on establishing a 
dynamic assessment of the evolving situation, comparing the 
forces for change versus the forces attempting to maintain the 
present situation. A crucial assumption for the scenario 
building is an inability to isolate the social changes already 
occurring from political, economic, and mi 1 itary issues. Each 
of the scenarios will include possible impediments to their 
successful implementation and key events that must occur for 
each alternative to succeed. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
The final chapter is an estimation of the most likely 
future scenario in Poland and recommendations for achieving 
the United States' national interests in Eastern Europe. In 
particular the concluding chapter of the thesis will use the 
3 
analysis of the earlier chapters to sugges t possible strate-
gies for ach i ev i ng the following national objectives: 
1. Democrati c Poland with a sound econom ic foundation, 
2. Government with the abi 1 ity to 
withou t resorting to the use, or 
force, 
influence the region 
threat, of military 
3. Country wi th long-term objectives complimenting 
U.S. national interests in the region . 
Poland, as the focal point of the Amer i can effort in 
Eastern Europe, ma y serve as a role mode l for other regimes 
in their struggle to establish non-communis t governments . 
This thes is wil 1 also include an appraisa l of expected costs 
and durat ion of each strategy, and a n estimation of the 
probability of accomplishing the proposed goal. 
By e xamining the economic , military, and political 
parameters affecting the new Polish gove rnment's freedom of 
action, th is t hesis i s intended to enhance the ability of 
American planners and policy-makers to shape futur e events in 
a country 's struggle for a non-communist pol itical system. 
This researc h thesis also implicitly addre sses the potential 
natu r e of future trends in the Soviet Union itself , as the 
government in Moscow continues to struggle wi th the changes 




I I. POLAND'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter provides a brief historical background 
identifying the key issues traditionally div i ding Poland and 
its neighboring states. The objective is to separate the 
emerging dilemmas as autonomy is achieved from Moscow, from 
those issues suppressed and not caused by Soviet domination. 
The chapter examines Poland's development by dividing the past 
500 years into three sections based on the relative strength 
of the political systems in Wa r saw and Moscow . 
The first section assesses the development of Poland in 
the context of a state strugg 1 i ng to survive in a host i 1 e 
environment but with a socie t y rough 1 y comparab 1 e to the 
social systems in the region . The second section examines 
the relationship between the Soviet Union and Poland from the 
end of World War I, when the USSR acquired a unique political 
system, until World War I I presented Moscow with t he chance 
to install communism in Poland behind the advancing Red Army. 
The third section analyzes Poland's development as a member 
of Moscow's alliance system since World War I I. 
Because the present conditions in Poland are t he direct 
result of policies and events during the period of Communist 
rule, this section will compr i se the bulk of the analysis. 
The chapter concludes with an assessment of factors that could 
be critical to Poland's ability to reverse the effects of 
Communist rule in the next decade. 
5 
A. POLAND'S PATH TO INITIAL RUSSIAN DOMINATION 
After the consolidation of the Russian pri ncipalities into 
a single state und er Ivan I I I (1462-1505), Poland and Russia 
struggled to dec i de which nation would domi na t e the region. 
Situated between three host i 1 e empires, Po 1 and cou 1 d not 
cons i stently con so lidate national objectives i nto an enduring 
fore i gn policy. The resulting d i spersal o f effort yielded 
only transitory a nd impermanent military success . 1 
The Po 1 is h no b i 1 i ty refused to surrende r i ts po 1 it i ca 1 
prerogat i ve to a centra 1 authority througho ut the 1500 and 
1600s. Repea t ed defeats by smaller nations demonstrated the 
weakness of t he Po 1 i s h p o 1 i t i c a 1 system . The m i 1 i tar y success 
dur i ng the f i nal qu arter of the seventeenth century failed to 
arrest Poland' s re lative decline in the abs enc e of any real 
unity or nat i ona l objectives. 
Between 17 7 2 a nd 1795 i nterna 1 i nstab i 1 i ty and mi 1 i tary 
weakness in Warsaw resulted in the absorpti o n of Poland by 
Aust r ia, Russ i a , and Prussia. In the Rus s i an portion of 
Po 1 and's for mer t err i tory intense hatred deve 1 oped between 
the Poles and thei r Russian leaders. Being pro-Russian and 
being a t r aitor became synonymous amo ng the Po 1 ish 
popu l ation . 2 
1Alexan der Gieysztor and others, Histo ry of Poland, 2nd 
Ed. ( Warszawa , Po land: Pol ish Scientific Pu b lishers, 1979), 
146. 
2w. F . Reddawa y and others, The Cambr i dge Hi story of 
Poland 1697 - 1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge Un i versity Press, 
1951 ) , 104. 
6 
Support for France during the Napo 1 eon i c Wars ensured 
Poland would not be treated favorably by Russia, and revolts 
in 1830 and 1863 were crushed. Failing to eradicate the idea 
of an independent Polish state among the Poles, Moscow's plan 
to "Russify" the population was unsuccessful. Suspicion of 
Poland prevented even a limited degree of self-government and 
contributed to the growth of Polish nationalism. 3 
The outbreak of World War gave Polish nationalists an 
opportunity for uniting Poland by force. A declaration 
promising autonomy became meaningless after Germany drove the 
Russian army out of Poland in 1914. It was only the collapse 
of Germany in 1918 and the signing of the Versailles Treaty 
that gave Poland its independence. 
Originally partitioned because of a fear that Poland's 
instability would spread to Prussia, the final partition was 
because of a fear that a stronger Po 1 and cou 1 d present a 
threat to Russia's European ambitions. 4 Poland failed to make 
a sufficient effort to defend itself or solve internal 
political problems and must assume part of the guilt for being 
partitioned. 5 Poland required either the direct support of an 
externa 1 power, or direct competition between its stronger 
neighbors to exist as a sovereign state. 
3Norman Davies, God's P 1 ayground a Hi story of Po 1 and, 
Vol. II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982 ) , 88. 
4christopher Duffy, The Military Life of Frederick the 
Great (New York: Atheneum, 1986), 263. 
5Gieysztor, A History of Poland, 333. 
7 
B. POLAND'S STRUGGLE TO COEXIST WITH THE USSR (1918-1945) 
President Wilson's peace plan called for reestablishing 
a Polish state. Poland's eastern border was vaguely defined 
at Versailles, and Warsaw attacked the USSR in April 1920 to 
regain the frontiers of 1772. Fighting was inconclusive; but 
the Bolsheviks, attempting to consolidate their power, signed 
the Treaty of Ri ga in 1921, moving Poland's border eastward. 
The war un i fied the Polish military, and brought the 
mi 1 i tary within t he ruling el ite. 6 An al li ance with France 
provided for mil i tary assistance if either Germany or the USSR 
at tempted to rev i se their frontier with Po 1 and by m i 1 i tary 
force. 7 The Polish state was unable to solve diverse 
political and economic problems resulting from the ideological 
and ethnic d i sag r eements inherited from its former ru 1 ers. 8 
A May 1926 coup established an anti-Russian military 
dictatorship under Marshal Josef Pilsuds k i. 
Poland's policy objectives during the 1930s were to retain 
its temporary great-power status, threatened by the military 
recovery of Russia and Germany, and avoid becoming the battle 
6Andrzej Kor bonski, "civil-Military Re l ations in Poland 
Between the Wars : 1918-1939," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 
1988, 173-4 . 
7Hans Ross , A History of Modern 




8George Kolankiewicz and Paul G. Lewis, Poland (New York: 
Pinter Publ i she rs , 1988), 10. 
8 
ground for Eastern Europe. 9 Th e German-Soviet Non-aggression 
Treaty in August 1939, eliminated Hitler's fear of a two front 
war. The subsequent German invas ~ on of Poland, su pported by 
a Soviet attack, quick 1 y overran the country and prevented 
Western intervention. 
Divided by the two nations, Po 1 and was subjected to a 
brutal attempt to obliterate the political, professional and 
cu 1 tura 1 e 1 i te by both occupying regimes. 10 With more 
experience in political extermination, initially t he Soviet 
NKVD proved to be far more destructive than the Gestapo in 
eliminating the Polish intellec tuals. 11 
Moscow estab l ished relations with the Polish government 
e x iled in London after the German invasion. A reconstituted 
Polish army, recruited from members of the 1939 Po l ish army, 
was strong l y anti-Russian and anti-communist. Evacuated 
during the counterattack at Stalingrad, many Soviet s consider 
thi s an example of Poland's unrel iabi 1 ity . 12 Di fferences 
betwee n Moscow and the Londo n Poles grew with the pr ospect of 
a successful defense aga i nst t he German invasio n . 
9M a x Be 1 off , The Fore i g n Po 1 i c y of So v i e t Rus s i a 1 9 2 9-
~. Vol. II 1936-1941 (London: Oxford Univers i ty Press, 
1949), 74 . 
10Te r es a Rakows ka-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, and 
Ivan Sylvain, Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesi on, Phase II, 
Vol. 2 (Ottawa, Canada: Departme nt of National Defence Canada, 
1984), 2 & 11 . 
11Dav i es , God's P 1 ayground A Hi story of Po 1 and , 44 7. 
12Ale xander Werth, Russia at War 194 1-1945 ( New Yo r k: 
Ca r roll & Gr af Publishers, Inc . , 1964), 637-39 . 
9 
Ber 1 in reported exhuming thousands of bodies of Po 1 ish 
officers in Apri 1 1943. Evidence pointed to an execution 
during 1940, when the USSR controlled the region. The Katyn 
Forest inc i den t ended the London Po 1 e-Sov i et re 1 at i onsh i p. 13 
In May 1943 15 ,000 Polish officers and men from the Soviet 
army formed a new "Polish" army to offset t h e political value 
of Poles f ighting in the West. Recruited from areas occupied 
pr i or to Jun e 1940 or Soviet citizens of Polish heritage, 
these sold iers were the "Polish liberators of Poland." 
Stalin r esolv ed not to subscribe to the "Riga fro n t i ers" 
or to acce pt a n anti -Russi an Po 1 and fo 11 ow ing the war. 14 With 
the Red Army approaching Warsaw in July 1944, Moscow 
establ i shed th e "Lublin Committee" to form a n "independent," 
"strong" an d "democratic" Poland. This pro - Soviet government 
contained nume rous po 1 it i ca 1 parties , but was dominated by 
former Po 1 ish Communist Party members . 15 
The Lo ndon Po 1 es reacted by ordering their resistance 
forces to "1 i be rate" Warsaw without Sov iet assistance to 
validate their claim of representing th e Polish people. 16 
13 I n Ap r i 1 1 9 9 0 the So v i e t U n i on off i c i a 1 1 y a dm i t ted for 
the first ti me the Soviet Secret police, and not the Nazis 
were respo ns ib le for the deaths. Moscow went as far as 
supplying a list of names of those buried in the mass grave. 
14werth, Russ ia at War 1941-1945, 639 . 
15The Po li sh Communist Party was decimated during Stalin's 
"Grea t Pur ge ." Claiming the Pol ish Party had contained 
fascist agen ts , the Comintern dissolved it in 1938. 
16stef an Ko r bons k i, The Po 1 ish Underground State, trans. 
Marta Erdma n (B ou lder: East European Quarte r ly, 1978), 169-
7 1 . 
10 
Following attacks by the underground forces on 1 August, the 
Soviets stopped advancing, and refused permission for Allied 
planes to use Soviet air bases to assist the resistance. 
Our i ng the two month batt 1 e over 90 percent o f Warsaw was 
leveled and 300,000 Poles killed; more importantly the 
leadership corps of the non - communist forces wa s ravaged. 17 
The Yalta Conference established Poland's borders along 
the Oder-Neisse river in the West and virtually the "Curzon" 
line in the east. (See Map) Besides being shi f ted westward 
11wert h , Russ i a at War 1941-1945, 883 . 
1 1 
nearly 150 miles, the new state became almost exclusively a 
Pol i sh and Catho li c population following the war. Poland lost 
20 percent of i ts 1939 te r ritory and s ix million of the 
pop u lation i n th e f ighting. Only 10.7% of the casualties were 
from military o perations. Today the civi li an deaths remain 
a major fac t o r in the enmity toward the Germans and Soviets. 18 
Besides the popu 1 at ion 1 osses, Po 1 an d 1 o st 38% of i ts 
we a 1 th and 50% o f i ts factories during the war. 19 The nation's 
intelligents i a was decimated: 5,700 teac he r s killed, 43% of 
the cultura l an d educational resources a nd 60% of the 
education a 1 f ac i 1 i t i es destroyed . 20 The impact of these 1 osses 
1s strongly i ndic ated when it 1s noted that in 1939 onl y 
110,000 peo pl e had a post-secondar y schoo l education. 
Duri ng t he int e r war period Poland f ai l e d to accommodate 
eit her of i t s s tronge r ne i ghbors or pre ve nt t heir collus i on 
against Pol ish te r r ito r y. Without milita r y a s s istance Po l and 
was not capab l e of maintaining its e xi stenc e and once again 
dis a ppeared f rom t he map of Europe. It was on ly when both of 
these co ndi t ion s were reversed that Poland reemerged in 1945 . 
C. POLAND'S ST RUGGLE TO ESCAPE SOVIET DOMINATION (1945-1985) 
Fo 11 owi ng 194 5 Moscow stripped Easter n Europe of its 
industr i al resour ces to replace losses suffered fighting 
18Ra kows ka -Harmstone, Warsaw Pact, 2 & 1 1. 
19Ko l an ki ewicz , Poland, 22. 
20zb i gn iew K. Brzezinski, The Sov i e t Bl ock (Cambridge: 
Harvard Un i ve rsity Pres s, 1967) , 9. 
1 2 
Germany. Stalin extracted $14 billion from Eastern Europe 
between 1945-55, rough 1 y the same amount as West Europe 
received from the Marsha 11 P 1 an. 21 S imu 1 taneous 1 y, Moscow was 
ensuring Eastern Europe would remain dominated by the USSR. 
Soviet actions provided for the acquisition of territory, 
maximized Soviet national security, contributed to economic 
growth, and supported domestic stability. 22 
It became increasing 1 y c 1 ear the Red Army wou 1 d ensure 
that the leaders of the new Polish state would be not only 
sympathetic to the USSR, but prepared to work under its 
leadership . Consequently, Poland's communist party grew from 
2 0 , 0 0 0 i n J u 1 y 1 9 4 4 to over 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n one year . 23 Po 1 and ' s 
communist leadership called for land reform and industrial 
nationalization. These platforms were not radically different 
from the positions of the other political part i es . 
The Po 1 i s h U n i ted Workers ' Party ( P UW P ) e 1 e c t i on i n the 
January 1947 elections finished the process of establishing 
a completely pro-Soviet government in Warsaw. Soviet Marshal 
Konstaintin Rokossovsky was appointed Minister of Defense and 
Poland's armed forces were restructured along Soviet lines. 
21Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations 
with Eastern Europe," Soviet Policy in Eastern Eu r ope, Sarah 
Meiklejohn Terry, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1984), 156. 
22valerie Bunce "The Empire Strikes Back: the Evolution 
of the Eastern Bloc k from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet 
Liability," International Organizations, Winter 1985, 3. 
23Kolan k iewicz, Poland, 14. 
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It 1 s estimated that 90% of the Off i cer Corps were Soviet 
officers and on l y 4-5% were prewar professional soldiers.24 
Higher mi 1 i tary education was formali ze d at university 
level academie s and an armaments industry developed in 
conjunction wi th a similar Soviet bu i ldup. Despite the 
modernization a nd education programs, mi 1 itary service was not 
an appealing profession. A lack of economic i ncentives, harsh 
training conditions, visible Soviet dominance, and a negative 
image hampered t he recruitment of career soldiers. 25 
The new economic program included: stat e ownership of the 
"means of pr od uc tion , " co 11 ect i vi zat ion o f agr i cu 1 ture and 
rapid indust r ia l i zation programs. Planning emphasized control 
of private consumption and allowed additional resources for 
' heavy industry. The effects of the Sov i et mandated econom1c 
mod e 1 quic k 1 y became apparent: "cloning " o f East European 
eco nomies red uc ed regional flexib i l i ty in production, 
res u lting in dep en dance on trade with the USSR. 
Poland' s Communi st Party leader, Wladaslaw Gomulka, had 
bee n in the Sov i et Union during the 1930s and was determined 
not to use Sta l i n 's inhumane methods to install communism in 
Poland. 26 Developing along the general Sov i et model, Polish 
leadership reta i ned a nationalistic outloo k on sensitive 
i nterna 1 issues and attempted to bu i 1 d a "Po 1 ish road to 
~Rakowska- Harmstone, Warsaw Pact, 63. 
~Rakowska-Harmstone, Warsaw Pact, 65. 
26oav i es, God's P 1 ayground A Hi story of Po 1 and , 54 7. 
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socialism." However, Gomu 1 ka' s repeated defiance of the 
Soviet Union and the Communist International was not tolerated 
by Stalin; Gomulka was replaced by Bierut in 1948 . 
Khrushchev's speech denouncing Sta 1 in at the Communist 
Party Congress in 1956 severely undercut the support for the 
local leaders installed following the war. All of the Eastern 
European communist parties were encumbered with the major 
political liability of widespread popular belief that their 
ultimate objective was the incorporation of the region into 
the USSR. 27 In Poland, already split into "Moscow" versus 
"Warsaw" factions, the sudden loss of Sovie t support 
threatened the PUWP with a loss of political control. 
In June 1956 strikes broke out as dissatisfaction peaked 
over the falling standard of living and the contin ued Soviet 
military presence. By October Gomulka had regained control 
of the PUWP . An uninvited Soviet delegation arrived in Warsaw 
on 19 October, and defused the situation without the bloodshed 
that was to occur 1 ess than two weeks 1 ater i n Hungary. 
Gomulka's return to power was only possible wit h Moscow's 
recognition of a need to a 11 ow some deviance to ensure 
domestic tranquility in Eastern Europe. 
Moscow allowed local elites to put a distinctive stamp on 
the i r count r i e s " road to soc i a 1 i s m . " 28 The USSR accepted that 
Po 1 and was not destroying the po 1 it i ca 1 system with the change 
2? Brzez i n s k i , The So v i e t B 1 o c , 3 3 . 
28Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back," 3. 
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of Party leadership, but just modifying it to suit the local 
conditions . 29 Th is was the first case of the Polish people 
forcing a change in PUWP leadership "main l y" over a failure 
of the economy, and not because of political characteristics. 
Following Gomulka's consolidation of power, the Polish 
military was pu r ged of its Soviet officers, including Marshal 
Rokossovsky . Loyalty to Gomulka and the regime became the key 
factor for continued military advancement, replacing direct 
al l egiance to Moscow. ~ A new independent nation a 1 Po 1 ish 
military doctr in e was formulated to eliminate direct Soviet 
in f iltration, wh ile restructuring the army into a sovereign 
entity within the socialist coalition.31 
A new i ndu st rialization drive begun in 1961 expanded the 
industrial structure by reverting to the pre-1956 economic 
development st r ategy. Poland remained eco nomically dependent 
on the Soviet Union's willingness to continually supply 
primary products and by the regional redundancy of economic 
assets. 32 The 1950s witnessed a major shift i n trade patterns 
among Comecon members, as the USSR shifted from an importer 
of Eastern European so 1 i d fue 1 s, to a net exporter of both 
liquid and sol i d fuels . 
• 
29Brzezinsk i , The Soviet Bloc, 260. 
~Rakowska- Harmstone, Warsaw Pact, 67. 
31Rakowska- Harmstone, Warsaw Pact, 68. 
32Bunce , " The Empire Strikes Back," 13 . 
1 6 
Economic reform was begu n following the 23~ Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and briefly slowed 
economic stagnation. However, 1 ack i ng Brezhnev' s persona 1 
support, the plan was rescinded.n Brezhnev's rule was marked 
by mounting economic problems, declining labor productivity, 
wasted resources and problems with feeding the masses.~ A 
similar economic structure, but without the USSR's internal 
resources, reflected and then internally magnified the 
problems in Poland. 
A s 1 owdown in economic growth throughout the East B 1 oc 
began in the early 1960s. Dissatisfaction with a declining 
standard of li vi ng in Czechoslovakia increased until reaching 
a clima x in the spring of 1968. Prospects for independent 
reform in Easte r n Europe were crushed with the in vasion of 
Czechoslovak ia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 . 
Poland's economic position had deteriorated by 1968 and 
students, encouraged by the initial results of the 
Czechoslo vakian e xample, challenged Gomulka's leadership 
position . The use of force provided temporary stab i lity, but 
it could not rectify the economic problem causing the 
upheava 1 : discontent in Eastern Europe was based on comparing 
33Anders As 1 und, Gorbachev' s Strugg 1 e for Economic Reform 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 10-13. 
34Yuri Andropov, "Speech at Central Committee Plenum," 
Pravda, 23 No vemb er 1982, 1. 
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the prese nt li vi ng standard with the We st ' s , and not aga i nst 
pre-commun is t 1 e ve 1 s. 35 
Policie s st ressing the economy a nd consumers" were 
implemented to p lacate the masses, not to alter the system . 36 
A shortage of consumer items, combined wi t h a n unexpected rise 
in food pri ce s i n December 1970 caused wo rker s to riot in 
Gdans k . Eq uat ed with an anti-regime revo l t, the strife was 
repressed by t he m i 1 i tary k i 11 i ng and wounding over 2, 000. 
Gomulkawa s r e p laced by Edward Giere k a ft e r su ffe r ing a "hear t 
at t ac k ." 
In the a ft ermath of the army's use o f f orce aga i nst the 
Polish people , mora l e again plummeted and t he army lost some 
credibili ty a s th e defender of the Pol i sh s t at e. Mi 1 i tary 
commanders wer e r emoved and replaced by off icers who had beg un 
th e ir car eer s dur ing World War I I Th e army withdrew from 
Po l is h pol iti cs a nd began to reform i tse 1f i nto a 
profes si o na l ly competent force i n an a t tempt t o regain popular 
1 e g i t i ma c y . 37 
The PUWP was once again faced by eco nom ic stagnation , a 
ho s tile pop u lati on , distrust of the government's promises of 
35char l es Gati , "Soviet Empire: Ali ve But Not Well," 
Soviet Fore i gn Pol i cy in a Changing World, Robbin F. Laird and 
Erik P. Hoffman ed . , (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986), 
6 11 . 
~J.F . Br own, Eastern Europe and Commun ist Rule (Durham: 
Di ke Unive r s it y Press, 1988), 8 . 
37A. Ross Johnson and Barbara K 1 i s ze ws k i , The Po 1 ish 
Mili tary af t e r Ma r t i al Law: Report of a Ra nd Con fe r e nce (Santa 
Mo n ic a : Ran d Co rpo r at i o n , June 1983) , v . 
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reform, and, a general perception of having been installed by 
the USSR. 38 The government implemented economic changes to 
modernize industry and resource development, but only after 
rescinding the price increases on meats and fuels and 
"suspending" a wage bonus plan . 
Gierek's reforms attempted to construct a new pattern of 
social and economic development. Heavily borrowing capital 
from the West, the program was designed to modernize Poland's 
economy and gain access to non-communist mar kets. Hard work , 
properly rewarded would be the . . ma1nspr1ng for econom1c 
progress a nd the route to "rebu i 1 d a second Po 1 an d . " 39 It was 
hoped that simultaneous inve s tment in both the consume r and 
heavy industries wo u ld raise the living standard and boost 
eco nomic growth. 
Bene fi ti ng from lower trade barriers, Poland e xpanded its 
c omm e r c i a 1 t i e s w i t h the West . A mismatch in e xports and 
i mpo r ts was accepted to trigger an increase in ind ustr ia 1 
prod uc tio n , and ultimately restore the trade ba lance at a 
hig he r le v el .~ Weste r n tech nology and credits were used to 
imp r ove Poland's economy and restore rapid growth . 
38olga A. Nar ki ewicz, Eastern Europe 1968-1984 (Totowa, 
N.J.: Barn e s & Noble Books, 1986), 65. 
39 o av id W. Pau l a nd Maur i ce D. Simo n , "P o land Today and 
Czechoslovakia 1968," Problems in Communism, Sep-O c t 1981, 30 . 
40Adam Br omke, "A New Junction in Polan d, " Problems of 
Communism, Sep-Oc t 1976, 3 . 
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Mismanagement and prob 1 ems in absorbing Western techno 1 ogy 
re su 1 ted i n most of the 1 oans being wasted. 41 Po 1 and's growth 
rate slowed shar ply by 1975 without access to Western markets 
as a resu lt of the world recession follow in g the petroleum 
price rise in 1973. The new technology demanded additional 
Western goods to maintain the equipment, further straining the 
ba l ance of payment problem. Instead of using the West to 
reduce the economy's dependency on the Soviet Union, Poland 
was becoming mor e dependent on cheap o i 1 imports and a 
guaranteed Sov i et market for its product s. 
The nationa l budget, strained by the subsidy burden 
required to maintain artificially low food prices, was running 
a large defici t, contributing to inflationary pressures. 
Price reform was required to balance s upply with consumer 
demand. In J un e 1976 the governme nt dras tically escalated 
fo od prices. Rep eating the events that had led to Gierek's 
r 1se to power, workers in several industrial centers rioted, 
fo rcing the reg ime to cancel the necessary price hikes. For 
the third time i n two decades, Pol ish workers prevented needed 
eco nomic ref orm . 
What began as a decade of promise was rapidly turning into 
a disaster : r ad i ca 1 measures were requ i red to overcome 
Poland's laggin g economic production. In 197 9 Poland's "net 
material produ cti on" decreased 2.5% from t he previous year's 
4 
'G eo r g e S c h o p 1 i n , __,_T__,_h!-'e"--_,S~o"--v'----'-i _,e'-"t'--U"'-'--'n'--'i'-"o"-'n__,__-'a"-'n--'-"'-d___,E~a-"'s-'t'--'e"-'r_n,_,__,E:..u""-'--r_,o:...~:p::....:e::o.. 
(New York: Fa c ts o n File, 1986), 9. 
20 
level for the first time during the post World War I I period. 
With the economy continuing to contract by 6. 1% in 1 980, 
Western bankers faced with a d di~ional Polish loan requests, 
began to question the nation's creditworthiness . 42 
The inflexible planned economy, geared to a five year plan 
and stable prices, prevented Poland's economy from reallocat-
ing resources, resu 1 t i ng in a s 1 ower growth than the West. 43 
Poland's government was reluctant to break relations with 
Western cred itors for fear of jeopardizing additional loans, 
e xport markets, and confronting i nternat ion a 1 ostracism. 44 
Economic failure removed one of the few ava i labl e means for 
legitimizing and suppor ting the PUWP and directl y contributed 
to soc i a 1 unrest . 45 
In July 1980 the Gierek government attempte d to reduce 
subsidie s on food products . With i n two wee ks individual 
worke r committe e s org an ized to coordinate differen t factories' 
demands grew into the Solidarity trade union, forcing Warsaw 
t o discus s wo rke rs' g r ievances. 46 Th e Gdansk Agreement, 
42 Br own, Easte rn Europe and Communist Ru 1 e, 469. 
43Hermann Clement, "CMEA Economic 
1970s," The CMEA Five-Year Plans in 
(Brussels: NATO, 1982), 31-34. 
Performan ce in the 
a New Perspective 
44 Jo hn Tag 1 i a b u e , " E as t Europe ' s L i n k s to Fore i g n 
Creditors Strained," New York Times, 17 January 1988, 8. 
45 Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Bac k ," 30. 
46Brumber g, The So vi et Unio n a n d Easte rn Eur ope, 313 . 
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31 August, legally recognized Solidarity as the first non-
communist controlled organization, capable of exerting 
political and economic power. 47 
The success of the 1980 strike can be attributed to the 
cooperation of the intellectuals and workers to achieve their 
objectives; the earlier strikes had been one or the other, but 
never both simultaneously striking together. Solidarity 
became progressively more radical unti l the concess1ons 
demanded, if met, would have prevented the regime from 
remaining communi st. 4S 
To prevent a possible Soviet invasion, General Jaruzelski 
declared martial law in December 1981. Military reliability 
was not serio usl y tested during the initial enforcement of 
ma r tial law as elite civilian security forces confronted the 
demonstrators. The mil i tary leadership filled the vacuum 
create d by a d i sintegration of the PUWP , but only reluctantly 
to avo i d a So v i e t attack . 49 With the imposition of martial 
law, the Party 's leading role in shaping soc i ety was no longer 
guaranteed. 50 
47 Jan B. de Weydentha 1, Bruce D. Porter , and Kevin Dev 1 in, 
T h e Po 1 i s h Dr am a : 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 2 ( Toronto : Le x i n g ton Book s , 1 9 8 4 ) , 
1 0 1 . 
48Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Ru 1 e, 10. 
49 Johnson, The Polish Military After Martial Law, v-vii. 
50G eo r g e Sa nf ord , M i 1 i tar y R u 1 e i n Po 1 and ( New York : S t . 
Martin's Press , 1986), 198. 
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The Soviet Union was apparent 1 y re 1 i eved to have the 
i nterna 1 prob 1 ems in Po 1 and so 1 ved without armed intervention, 
but was worried that the psychological barrier of army 
intervention had been broken making the return of the army a 
permanent threat. The army's role was doctrinal heresy and 
restoring the PUWP' s po 1 it i ca 1 power was a major Soviet 
objective as early as January 1982. 51 By letting t h e Poles do 
the job of suppressing Solida r ity the USSR had less control 
over the "norma 1 i zat ion" process than had been the case in 
either Hungary or Czechos 1 ovak i a. 52 
Wa s hington and the West responded to t h e impo sition of 
martial law by stopping all foreign aid and imposi n g stiff 
econom1c sanctions. 53 The most painful sanction, and 
consequently the most effective, was the loss of Western 
credits. Without hard currency, imports of foodstuffs were 
reduced b y 54% between 1980/81 and 1982/83 direct l y lowering 
the already meager living standard of the populat i on. 
The Soviets attempted to stabilize Poland with a massive 
influ x of economic assistance. Raw materia 1 s and consumer 
51Garton Ash, "Po 1 and and the A 11 i ance," Washington 
Quarterl y , Spring 1982, 139. 
52Korbons k i, So v iet Po 1 icy in Eastern Europe, 88. 
53A. Ross Johnson and Barbara Kliszewski, Un i ted States 
Po lic y Toward Poland (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, April 
1987 ) , 10. 
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items were double the five year plan 's l eve1. 54 In 1983 
Poland's trade deficit with the USSR was equivalent to a $1 
bi 11 ion loan. 55 Western sanctions and the coinciding Soviet 
ass i stance limited Poland's flexibility to introduce economic 
reforms not compati ble or acceptable to the Soviet Union. 
The Pol is h population under communist and military rule 
had become strongly suspicious of even well- in tentioned reform 
proposa ls . Past sacrifices were not seen to have been 
adequate 1 y compensated. 56 Jaruze 1 ski's government was thus 
faced wit h a continuing lack of confidence by a majority of 
the population . The e 1 ect ion of M i kh a i 1 Gorbachev to the 
1 eade r sh i p of the Communist Party of the USSR p 1 aced the 
Pol i sh regi me in an awkward position. Fa i lure of economic 
reforms in Po la nd could spread to the Sovi e t Union, damaging 
Gorbache v ' s posit i on . 57 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Poland's hi stor ical e xperience during the last 500 years 
has bee n a struggl e to prevent stronger or bette r organized 
54" v i c e M i n i s t e r 
16 Decembe r 1982, 
Exchang e fo r 1983." 
Hails Soviet Help for Pol a nd, " FB IS -EEU, 
G11 and "Planned Pol ish-Soviet Trade 
FBIS-EEU, 20 June 1983, G3 3 . 
5S"Features of Polis h-Soviet Trade Reviewed," FBIS-EEU, 
5 December 19 83, G3; "Features of Polish-Soviet Trade 
Rev i ewed . " FBIS-EEU, 5 December 1983, G3-4 . 
56J.F. Brown, Poland Since Marti a l Law (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, December 1988), 15. 
57 Tad Szu lc , " Poland's Path," Foreign Po licy, Fall 1988, 
224. 
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neighbors from ravaging society. The elite's inabi l ity to ban 
together and p 1 ace nation a 1 i nterests over persona 1 goa 1 s, 
directly contributed to Poland's partitioning. 58 Unwi 11 ing to 
sacrifice part of their individual powers to the king, the 
nob 1 es prevented Po 1 and from deve 1 oping a strong centra 1 
government to marshal resou r ces efficiently and repulse 
foreign 
Poland 
invaders. Internal political weaknesse s prevented 
from taking advantage of its territorial and 
population's size advantages. Consequent 1 y, Po 1 and became 
completely dominated by Russia and Prussia by 1800. 
Polish nationalism frustrated Moscow's effort to Russify 
the region but failed to reform a Polish state. It was only 
the simultaneous military defeat of Poland's stronger 
neighbors and Pr esident Wilson's vision of the future that 
restored a n in dep endent Polish nation. 
A wea k political system and a fa i lure to maintain a 
rel i able military alliance wi t h an e xternal powe r prevented 
Poland from establishing a solid foundation betwee n the world 
wars . Unable to regain its independence following German y 's 
aggression in 1939, after World War I I Poland reverted to a 
subservient position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Under Soviet 
domination Pola nd failed to develop a strong central bureau-
cracy, or a government with the support of the people . 
Regardles s of its relative strength, Poland has been 
unable t o unite in a common ef f ort to prevent being dominated 
~Reddaway, The Cambridge History of Poland, 139. 
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by a foreign government. Only with the assistance of a 
benevolent foreign government, from outside of the region, 
has Poland been able to exist as an independent and sovereign 
nation since the end of the eighteenth century. While hesi-
tant to form a united opposition to an invader, the Polish 
people are unwilling to become docile subjects of a foreign 
government. Ultimately they hope to achieve their desire for 
an independent Polish state. 
26 
I I I. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
This chapter's objective is ' to examine the economic 
conditions in Poland, and how the economy will limit the 
Solidarity government's ability to implement reform programs. 
Identifying the critical factors, if any, that could allow 
the USSR to maintain, if not expand, its influence in Poland 
is the first step toward formulating a comprehensive American 
policy in Poland. After determining the effect of key issues, 
three alternative scenarios will be presented. 
This chapter primarily focuses on establishing a dynamic 
assessment of the evolving situation, comparing the forces for 
change versus forces attempting to maintain the present s i tua-
tion. The conclusion attempts to gauge the most 1 ikely 
future, within the present international situation. The 
questions to be addressed in detail include: 
1. What is Po 1 and's foreign debt to the West and the Soviet 
Union, and how will the debt restrict the policies of 
a non-communist government? 
2. To what degree is Po 1 and economi ca 11 y dependant on 
Soviet supplied primary products? 
3. What effect w i 1 1 the present low level of product 
quality have on Poland's ab i 1 it y to quickly enter 
Western free markets? Specifically, w i l 1 t he Soviet 
Union retain its position as the main trading partner 
of the " " Polish state. new 
4. W i 11 f i nanc i a 1 assistance prevent the economy from 
deteriorating to such a point that Poland becomes 
unstable, and hence uncontrollable, without resorting 
to mil itary force? 
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5. W i 11 Western nations be w i 11 i ng to provide the f i nanc i a 1 
assistance that may be required in part (4) above after 
the present euphoria is replaced by a demand for a long 
term program without a guarantee of success? 
A. HARD CURRENCY DEBT 
Prior to the 1 ate 1960s, the "co 1 d war" prevented any 
significant amo unt of trade between the East-West b 1 ocs. 
Detente re 1 axed po 1 it i ca 1 tensions and opened up the poss i b i 1-
ities for trade. Prime Minister Edward Gierek seized avail-
ab 1 e Western credits and techno 1 ogy as a so 1 uti on to the 
economic problems leading up to the unrest that had toppled 
the previous reg i me. During the first half of the decade the 
government was able to increase real income while extensively 
investing capital in heavy industry. However, these goals 
were accomp li shed by borrowing heavily from the West. Table 
indicates the r apid growth 1n Poland's trade balance and 
foreign debt wi t h the West, but does not inc 1 ude the $1.5 
billion owed to t he Soviet Union. 
TABLE 1: 
POLISH FOREIG N TRADE AND DEBT 1971-1989 ($billion U.S.) 
1970 1975 1980 
GNP 34.8 54.7 54.4 
EXPORTS 3.5 10.3 17.0 
IMPORTS 3 . 6 12.5 1 9 . 1 
TRADE DEF. -.1 -2.2 -2. 1 
DEBT 1 • 1 10.7 24.6 
1981 1986 
51 . 1 72 . 8 
13.2 11 . 9 















Data sources: World Bank World Debt Tables, 1988-89; "GUS 
Issues 1989 So c ioeconomic Report," FBIS-EEU; United Nations 
Statistical Yearbook, 1985/86. 
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To further complicate Poland's foreign trade problems is 
the 6.5 billion TR deficit within CMEA, 94% of which is owed 
to the Soviet Union. 59 Payment on the i ntra-CMEA and hard 
currency debt have been deferred for 10 years, but Moscow 
cou 1 d demand or threaten immediate restitution to contro 1 
Po 1 and's actions. 60 Because this deficit is not in a 
convertible currency, Poland may be faced with hav i ng to pay 
this portion of its debt with a barter-type arrangement. 
Poland's slow economic growth in the late 1970s combined 
with high interest rates prevented export earnings from 
covering the rising debt payments. The tota 1 debt-service 
ratio in 1979 exceed 100%, forcing the government to 
reschedule its debt payments. The Polish government has been 
forced to reschedule part of i t s debt every year since 1982. 
I n 1 9 8 5 Po 1 and reached a peak when "prof i t s" from hard 
currency exports allowed the government to make 75% of its 
interest payments. 61 Po 1 and's debt in the 1980s has gown as 
a result of two factors: failing to make interest payments; 
and, banks rolling over the unpaid balance. 1t is noteworthy 
59
"Poland Debts Hamper the Economy," Radio Free Europe 
Research, Polish SR/10, 16 June 1989, 35. 
60
"solidarity Expert Links Coalition to Foreign Aid." 
EEU, 17 July 1989, 36-7 and "Trade Links Between Poland, 
Analyzed." FBIS-EEU, 29 November 1989, 76-7. 
FBIS-
USSR 
61Keith Crane, Pol ish Economic Pol icy and Western Economic 
Leverage (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., July 1987), 4. 
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that Po 1 ish debt has not increased from addition a 1 1 oans 
injecting investment capita 1 into the country . 62 
Austerity measures were introduced in 1980 to cut imports 
and a 11 ow the state to pay Western banks (see Tab 1 e 1). 
Reducing imports t o obtain hard currency and repay the foreign 
debt squeezed domestic production and i nvestment; the 
government purchased a current account surplus at the expense 
of future growt h. 63 These measures extracted a cost; it was 
not until 1982 that domestic product i on e x ceeded the 1979 
1 eve 1 . 
B. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET PRIMARY PRODUCTS 
Poland is self-sufficient in coal, sulfu r , and copper but 
1 acks a 11 other i ndustria 1 primary products. Po 1 and has 
relied on Comecon for two-thirds of its intermediate raw 
materials ; 70% o f which come from the USSR. 64 Poland is 
heavily depende nt on the Soviet Union for oil and natural gas, 
but wit h massi ve coal production remains a net energy 
e x porter . With energy consumption rising steadily, Poland 
will have a 3-5, 0 00 megawatt energy shortage by the end of the 
62
" Art i c 1 e Notes Deter i oration in Indus t ry . " FBI S-EEU, 18 
November 1987, 38- 4 0 . 
63Ke i th Crane, The Creditworthiness of Eastern Europe in the 
1980s (Santa Mo n ic a: Rand Corporation, January 1985), 1. 
64
" 0 f f i c i a 1 P r e s s 0 f f i c e I s s u e s R e port on 1 9 8 2 . " F B I S - E E U , 3 
January 1983, G9. 
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decade i f co a 1 product i on does not i ncr ease rap i d 1 y . 65 Natura 1 
gas is becoming an important source of energy for Poland as 
Moscow reduces its oil exports. Heavily relying on the USSR, 
Poland's imports have increased from 4.0 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) in 1981 to 7.5 bcm by 1987. 66 Poland has invested TR930 
mi 11 ion in return for a guaranteed 44. 6 bcm of natural gas 
over the next 20 years.~ Linke d to Soviet natural gas fields, 
it wi 11 be difficult to integrate into a new supply system 
without aggravating a constrained economy. 
The PUWP viewed nuclear power as a method for reducing 
Poland's dependance on Soviet s u pplies of oil/natural gas and 
solving env i ronmenta 1 problems related to the co a 1 burning 
industrial plants." In 1985/8 6 Poland's nuclear capability 
was non-e x istent , but is expected to reach 15% of all 
e l e c tr i cal power production by the year 2000. 69 De 1 ayed by 
economic problems and the Chernobyl disaster, the first 
65
"Fuel Cuts Highlight Problem 
Free Europe Research, Polish SR/17, 
in the Energy Se c tor," 
18 December 1987, 15. 
Radio 
66
"Natural Gas to Play Larger Role in Soviet Foreign Trade," 
Radio Free Europe Liberty Research, RL 340/88, 28 July 1988, 3. 
67
" Achievements in Fue 1, Power, Supp 1 i es Reported." FBI S-EEU, 
2 March 1982, G27. 
68
"Nuclear Power in the CMEA Countries: a Case of Misplaced 
Priorities?" Radio Fr ee Europe Research, RAD BR/104, 19 June 1989, 
1 . 
69 John M Kramer, "Chernoby 1 and Eastern Europe," Prob 1 ems of 
Communism, November -December 19 8 6, 41 ; and "Fue 1 Cuts High l i ght 
Problems i n the Energy Sector," Radio Free Europe Research, Polish 
SR/17, 18 December 1987, 16. 
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nuclear power s t ation wi 11 not be in servi c e unti 1 1991 at 
the earliest, a full ten years behind schedu l e . 70 
C. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
1. Agriculture 
Self-sufficient in agricultural products before 1939, 
Poland today imports food to make up for chronic production 
s h or t f a 1 1 s . C h a r act e r i z e d by s m a 1 1 f am i 1 y f arms whose aver age 
size is only 15 ac r es, 45% of Polish farms produce nothing for 
the market . Only 6% of all Polish farms are greater than the 
minimum acreage ( 16 acres) required to produce an income level 
comparable with the urban population. 71 
The sma 11 acreage of most farms combined with a 
1 imited amount of mechanization makes agriculture a key sector 
for modernization. To encourage efficiency and boost output, 
the new governmen t has eliminated some food subsidies, raising 
prices between 40 and 300 percent overnight . 72 Rural regions 
fear they wi 11 be forced to suffer the bu r den of economic 
70" 1 n Po 1 and Second Thoughts About Nuc 1 ear Power P 1 ants," Radio 
Free Europe Research , Polish SR/2, 8 February 1988, 20. 
71Kolankiewicz , Poland, 35. 
72 John Daniszews k i, "Food Costs Skyrocket 1n Poland," Monterey 
Herald, 2 August 1989, 4 . 
32 
reforms while workers and townspeople are cushioned with 
subsidies. 73 
Unwilling to sell their products for a loss on a 
partially closed market, some rural regions have resorted to 
destroying their produce, while others have gone to a barter 
system. 74 The government's economic reform package is intended 
to give Poland a more market-o r iented economy and lower the 
inflation rate . 75 Unless farmers respond or drastic action is 
taken, Poland will have to continue spending e xport revenues 
to import food . A continued agricultural deficiency could 
u 1 t imate 1 y undermine any progress made in the go vernment's 
attempt to overhaul the economy by diverting limited capital 
from industrial modernization projects. 
2. Industry 
The Soviet econom1c model require s large-scale 
capital, energy, and material investment s into heavy 
industries. However, without access to Western markets Poland 
could not benefit from the economies of scale required to make 
the industries profitable. Geared to products sen s itive to 
73
"Private Farmers protests Continue," Radio Free Europe 
Research, Polish SR/6, 7 April 1989, 36. 
74
"Mazow i ec k i Go vernment Fights to Keep Po 1 and's Economy 
Alive," Radio Free Europe Research, Polish SR/15, 12 October 1989, 
14; "Private Fa r mers' Protests Continue," Rad i o Free Europe 
Research, Polish SR/6, 7 April 1989, 34. 
75
"Po 1 and Institutes series of wide Price I ncr ease s ," San Jose 
Mercury News, 2 January 1990, SA. 
33 
tech nological progress, the plants must also be continuo u sly 
mode r nized t o kee p operating costs compet i t i ve.76 
Indus t ry i s the largest sector of the Polish economy 
yielding nea r l y ha lf of all national income. However, 30% of 
the present i n du s t r ia 1 comp 1 exes were bu i 1 t d u ring the 1950s. 71 
Using Wester n techno 1 ogy to produce qua 1 i t y goods, War saw 
hoped to red uc e i t s dependency on the Soviet economy in the 
1970s. Inst ea d , Po 1 and was i ncapab 1 e of absorbing the new 
technol og y; ad van ced projects either f a i 1 ed to reach 
comp 1 et i on o r o pe ra ted we 11 be 1 ow inten d e d capac it y . The 
state's a u th o r i t a r ian system lim i ted the inno v atio n process, 
preventing most n ew i deas from being i mp 1 eme nt ed. 78 
Warsaw ' s ability to import technolog y will be limited 
u n t i 1 c r edito r s a re confident Po 1 and is a reasonable ris k . 
The require d p r oo f of credit worthiness w i 1 1 depend on an 
ability to repay l oans by increasing e x po r t ear nings. Polan d 
is in a "Catch 22 " s i tuatio n: fina n cia l r e s ponsib i 1 i ty wi 11 
req u i r e p ayi n g of f the present debt by i mport ing technolog y 
and incre a s in g t h e competitiveness of export i terns; but to 
imp or t techno l ogy requires issuing add i t i onal loans that 
76z bigniew M. Fa llenbuchl, "Poland's Economic Crisis," Problems 
of Commun i s m, March -April 1982, 4. 
77 Kola nk iewi c z, Pola n d, 101-2. 
78E ast Euro p ean 
Publications, 198 5), 
Economic 
165. 
Ha n dboo k 
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require prior demonstration of the exportabi 1 ity of Pol ish 
products . 
D. FOREIGN AID REQUIREMENTS 
Western financial aid wi ll be required for a rapid 
economic recovery. The Solidarity government has estimated 
a minimum requirement of $10 billion in foreign aid over the 
next three years. 79 Poland's future economic success depends 
on access to modern management methods, emerging technology, 
and an inflow of both small and corporation capita1. 80 With 
the "iron curtain" gone throughout Eastern Europe, Poland is 
competing against numerous credit requests. As indicated 
below, adequate Polish aid is presently not assured. 
1. Prime Minister Kaifu departed from traditional Japanese 
foreign assistance pattern, generally 1 imited to nations 
in Asia, by pledging $150 million to a multinational 
fund to stabilize the Polish economy as part of a $2 
billion package to Eastern Europe. The policy 
immediately came under attack by Japanese businessman 
and bankers, sine~ it might not bring any tangible 
benefits to Japan.S l 
2. Congress has approved a $738 million aid package for 
Warsaw and Budapest over 3 years, and proposed an 
additional $511 million package for all of Eastern 
Europe. President Bush acquiesced to the initial bill, 
but e x pressed concern ove r its costs and has recommended 
79 John Tagiabue, "Solidarity Plan Seeks $10 Bi 11 ion in Aid for 
Po 1 and ' s Economy , " New York T i me s , 17 June 1 9 8 9 , 6 ; "So 1 i dar i t y 
Ex pert Links Coalition to Foreign Aid," FBIS-EEU, 17 July 1989, 36. 
80
"Jaruzelski Addresses World Economic Forum," FBIS-EEU, 5 
February 1990, 61. 
81 James Sterngold, "Japanese Fault Premier on His Trip to 
Europe," New York Times, 26 January 1990, 8. 
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on 1 y $300 mi 11 ion in the new budget request. 82 Senator 
Robert Dole has proposed cutting U.S. foreign aid by 5% 
to the top five recipients, but this plan would only 
free $3~0 million to be applied towards all of Eastern 
Europe. 3 The invasion of Panama and th e e 1 ect ions in 
Nicaragua hav e created two more strong demands on the 
foreign assistance available. 
3. One bi 11 ion dollars was been pledged by 24 Western 
nations toward Poland in November 1989, but the rapid 
spread of democratic reform throughout sfastern Europe 
has diluted Warsaw's share of the money . According to 
a foreign policy advisor to French President Francois 
Mitterrand , "the creation of this i nstitution was 
considered to be a highly symbolic political act by many 
de 1 egat ions. " 85 
4. The IMF has authorized a 13 month $710 million loan to 
help the gov ernment combat the inflation problem. Both 
the IMF an d the Polish government agreed that the first 
step toward economic recovery must be to lower Poland's 
high inflation rate: 500% inflat i on in 1989 and 79% in 
January 1990. 
82Robert Pear, " A Broad Program of Aid to Po 1 and is Voted by 
House," New Yor k Times, 20 October 1989, 1. 
B3charles Kr a uthammer, "Dole's Nonsens ica l Foreign Ai d 
Proposal," San Jose Mercury News, 23 January 1990, 7B. 
UEdward Cody and John M. 
Polish Aid," Monte r ey Herald, 
Goshko, "Nations OK $1 Bi 11 ion 
14 December 1989, 1. 
in 
85Edwa r d Cody , "E. Europe Bank P 1 an Nego t iated," Monterey 
Herald, 16 Jan u ary 1990, 2. 
86
"camdess us Ca l ls Agreement With Poland Positive Step Toward 
Economic Stab i lity ," IMF Survey, 8 January 1990, 5; "Retail Prices 
Rise 78.6% in 1 Mo nth ," FB IS-EEU, 16 February 1990, 56. 
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5. The World Bank has signed loans totaling $360 million 
to finance the industrial and food industr i e~ and is 
neg o t i at i n g for an add i t i on a 1 $ 1 b i 1 1 i on 1 o an . 87 . 
6 . Chancellor Helmut Kohl offered more than $1 billion in 
aid in late October before the Berlin Wall fell. 
Unification's financial burden on West Germany will 
limit Bonn's ability to assist Poland's economic 
restructuring any further.~ 
The previous analysis of the present economic conditions 
will be used to develop three possible scenarios for Poland. 
Each of the a 1 ternat i ves are comp 1 ete 1 y independent of the 
other two and are not subject to events outside of Poland's 
economic environment. 
E. THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
1. Economic Collapse 
In th i s scenario Po 1 a nd does not rece ive adequate 
fore i gn aid to prevent econom i c collapse. Th is s cenario is 
1 ik e l y if the Pol ish people are unwi 11 ing to support the 
austere conditions required to restructure the economy and 
place it o n a healthy footing . Failure of past reforms have 
bee n caused by a reluctance o f the population to renounce: 
overfull employment with its a s sociated ineffic i ency, greater 
87
"Mazow i eck i Economic Reforms Gain Support Abroad," FBI S-EEU, 
21 February 1990, 39. 
~ It is estimated East Germa ny will need at least $375 billion 
to modernize industry and infras tructure and an additional $100 
billion to stop the e xodus to West Germany of people crucial to an 
East German economic recovery. " Bonn Weighs 1-1 Rate on Mark," San 
Jose Mercu ry News , 2 3 February 1 9 9 0 , 1 ; A 1 i son Sm a 1 e , "Aged , 
Dilapidated In f r astructure Stifl e s Change," San Jose Me r cury News, 
19 February 1990, 5D . 
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than single digit inflation for a prolonged period, and an 
e 1 ement of po 1 it i ca 1 contro 1 over the economy to enforce, 
needed but unpopu l ar measures.~ 
I n 1 9 8 9 Po 1 and ' s e con om 1 c product i on decreased for the 
first time since 1982. Polls show Solidarity's support at 
only 48%, already 11% below the November 1989 level; support 
is not shifting to other parties, people are becoming 
"undecided or apathetic" towards politics. 90 This trend 
contradicts Gorbac hev's recent call for mass involvement to 
overcome the people's alienation from powe r in Communist 
socie t ies. 91 Un 1 e ss these tendencies are reversed, Po 1 and may 
rapidly proceed down a path of economic collapse to 
instability. 
2 . Economic Equilibrium 
This scenario assumes Poland will receive an adequate 
amou nt of fo r eig n aid to prevent econom ic collapse. The 
economy wi 11 not achieve a moderate growth rate, instead it 
wil 1 essentially su stain the performance level of the 1980s. 
89 Ke i th Cran e, Po 1 ish Ba 1 ance of Payments and Output 
Alternative Scenarios (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 




"Po 11 C 1 aims So 1 i dar i ty Losing Support," FBI S-EEU, 6 February 
1990, 57. 
91Mikhail Gorbachev, "Perestroika," Vital Speeches, 15 October 
1989, 5. 
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The standard of 1 iving in Poland wi 11 remain constant or 
' decrease from its current level. 
The numerous changes i n Poland's polit i cal leadership 
since 1945 have been more the direct result of economic 
failure than the political po l icies of the PUWP. 92 This does 
not imply that the people were satisfied with the Communist 
political system. The Soviet presence and the secret police 
force allowed the PUWP to contain popular resentment until 
relative economic deprivation finally overwhelmed the Party's 
repressi ve elements. 
The Mazow i eck i government has imp 1 emented a very 
d i ffic u lt program which is expected to create the f oundations 
fo r a market economy; unemployment is becoming a r eality a nd 
price s have risen, but appear to be stabil i zi ng. Spreadi ng 
pro t est s , as t he measure s ta ke effect, could fo r ce a repeal 
and watering down of the refo r m package: ultimat e l y causing 
their failure or persistently delaying progress . 93 
Forty-five years of e conomic decision mak i ng must be 
reversed ; eff i cient us e of labo r , materia l r eso urces, and 
fi xed assets has to become a universally observed rule and 
92Narkiewicz, Eastern Europe 1968-84, 71. 
93
"coal Miners 1n Poland Strike for Hi ghe r Pa y ," ,_,N'"""e:....:.w.:..___,Y--"o"-'r_k'-'-
Times, 19 Ja nuary 1990, 11A; and Steven Greenhouse, "Slow Pace for 
Refo r m in East Bloc," New Yor k Times, 29 Janua r y 1990. 1C. 
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something that is considered an everyday chore . " A high level 
of r e 1 i ance on Western techno 1 ogy imports i s necessary to 
maintain economic growth in Poland. This wi 11 require a 
satisfactory solution to the debt problem. The agreement to 
reschedule and only make interest payments for eight years on 
2 5% of the debt i s a f i r s t step . 95 To acce l erate growth by 
increasing the input of capita 1 or 1 abor does not appear 
possible; a rapid growth in productivity is needed for a true 
economic recovery.% 
Solidarity's leadership was not prepared to assume 
power in 1989 . 9 Burdened by central planni n g and a massi v e 
foreign debt, the new leaders must restructure the country's 
econom y before progress w i 11 be seen. Investment in the 
future is the key to getting the correct balance between a 
countr y 's eco n omi c prosperity and we a 1 th. 98 Shifting to a 
market economy will not be easy; it wi ll be like ta k ing a 
94
"Po 1 i tburo Discusses Referendum, CMEA," FBI S-EEU, 4 November 
1987, 28. 
95
" Agreement Creates 1 4-Year Debt Reschedu 1 i ng," FBI S-EEU, 21 
February 1990, 38. 
96crane, Po 1 ish Ba 1 ance of Payments and Output, 17. 
97
"Walesa Views Soviet Troop Pullout, Other Issues," FBIS-EEU, 
9 February 1990, 64 . 
98Paul Ke n nedy, "Economic and Military Security," Vital 
Speeches, 15 July 1978, 597. 
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polar bear bred for arctic weather and uprooting it to the 
equator. The bear (economy) ultimately may adjust, but it 
will take time and a lot of sweat. 99 
3. Economic Success 
This scenario predicts a Pol ish economic recovery with 
an above average performance and growth rate. The standard 
of living will increase at a rate comparable with Poland's 
performance during the first half of the 1970s. Po 1 and w i 1 1 
receive financial assistance, either governmental grants or 
commercial loans, comparable with the level of the Marshall 
Plan. 
The new government must rapidly get the economy back 
on its feet before popular s u pport subsides in the face of 
tough economic policies. The January reforms are the first 
steps toward rev ita 1 i zing prod u ction by ba 1 anc i ng the nation a 1 
budget and creating a market-oriented economy. 100 There wi 11 
be layoffs and bankruptcies as inefficient industries are 
eliminated and state-owned enterprises are privatized. If 
unemployment compensation will be financially possible, Poland 
will have developed a solution to a major economic hurdle. 
Po 1 and's prospects fo r success depend on a poo 1 of 
educated and trained workers, and a very low living/pay 
99Marshall I. Goldman, "Outlook is Bleak for Transformation," 
San Jose Mercury News, 26 Februa r y 1990, 60. 
100
"Poland Institutes Series of Wide Price Increases," San Jose 
Mercury News, 2 January 1990, SA. 
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standard ho l d i ng costs down initially, allowin g entry into 
Western mar kets. Rela x ing Western restrict i ons on techno-
1 og i ca 11 y ad va nced products cou 1 d acce 1 erate economic progress 
by improvin g t h e efficiency, and more importantly, opening the 
Po 1 ish economy to Western firms with their a 1 r e ady estab 1 i shed 
connectio ns o n g 1 o ba 1 markets. 101 Western i nvestment wo u 1 d 
bring in resour ce s to reno vate aging capital s t oc k , inject up-
to-date tec hnol ogy and 
e xports . 102 
F. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
improve the competitiveness of 
The three sc en arios above and the issues assessed in t he 
first sect i o n of the chapter will now be use d to generate a 
hiera r chy o f poss ib le developments within the Polis h economy. 
The li ke li ho o d o f the ind i vidual scenar i os were evaluated 
based o n th e relat i ve contribution of eac h q ue s t i on analyzed 
toward real i zin g t he possible scenario. 
1. Har d Currency 
Po land' s $40 billion foreign debt is an albatross 
around the nec k o f the Solidarity government . Just ma k ing the 
interest pa yme nt s will require a substant i al portion of the 
profits generat e d f rom exports. Divert i ng the capital away 
10 1c 1 yde H. Far nsworth, "U.s. Set to Ease High-Tech Curb o n 
Eastern Europe, " New Yor k Times, 23 January 199 0 , 1 . 
102c ha r le s H. Mo v i t, "Radical Steps Could Re v i ve Economies," San 
Jos e Me r cur y News, 26 February 1990, 60 . 
42 
from investment to repay the debt will magnify the problems 
of converting to a free market economy. To prevent Poland 
from becoming unstable the West will manage to alleviate some 
of the debt payments but will probably not underwrite enough 
of the payments to allow Poland to succeed economically. 
2. Economic Dependence 
Poland wi 11 be able to shift suppliers during the next 
ten years and minimize their dependance on the USSR. 
Geographical considerations wi ll probably keep Po li sh-Soviet 
trade relations from forcing Poland to completely shift 
suppliers, i.e., it will st i ll be cheaper to buy Soviet 
products because of transportation costs being 1 ower. The 
So v iet Union will not want to allow Poland to comp l etely pull 
out of the present trade pattern and wil 1 take steps to ensure 
its competitiveness in Poland's free market economy . Success 
is not likely because the process of shifting suppliers will 
result in at least temporary supply problems, increasing the 
already high inefficiency in the Polish economy. 
3. Productivity 
If only modest success can be achieved in achieving 
a free market, Poland should maintain its present standard of 
living. The breakdowns and resistance to changes in Poland 
and a lack of familiarity with capitalism will sta l l Poland's 
drive for a free market in the near term; just overcoming the 
fo r ty-five year process of bei ng told individual wealth is bad 
43 
will take time. 
not be obtained . 
Success in the next ten yea r s will probably 
4. Foreign Aid 
Poland's r equests for foreign aid will probably not 
be met. The col l apse of Communist contro l th r oughout Eastern 
Europe as we l l a s the demands of all the Third World nations 
w i 11 prevent an adequate amount of assistance from being 
obtai ned by Po 1 a nd. The West and the Sov i ets w i 11 not want 
Poland serving a s a example of complete fa il u r e after economic 
reforms are intr oduced, they will find the necessary 
ass i stance to en s ure Poland does not become unstable . 
Unli mited global demands and a 1 imited supp l y of economic 
assistance w i 11 pr event Po 1 and from receivi ng enough a i d to 
become a n eco nomic success. The co 11 apse o f commu ni sm in 
Easte rn Europe has eliminated their trump car d of being the 
le a d i ng co un t r y th a t has rejected Moscow ' s e conomi c s ystem. 
5. Western Support 
The arg ument s for Western support are very similar to 
the o ne' s presen t ed above. The case of German un ification is 
the only sign i f icant difference. France, Gr eat Britain and 
the Soviet Un i o n a re concerned about the future implications 
for a single Ge rmany . Poland may be used t o offset German 
influence in Ce ntr a l Europe and hence may r eceive economic 
support for mi l itar y and political reasons unr elated to the 
present situat io n. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
Poland's history under communist rule is of economic 
failure leading to political change. A large foreign debt 
combined with obsolete industrial equipment require's austere 
financial policies: regard 1 e s s of the soc i a 1 or e con om i c 
ideology in the government's t op leadership positions. The 
emotional and unanticipated social changes throughout the East 
Bloc during 1989-1990 will require time to become institu-
tionalized . This is a necessary condition to ensure follow-
on events cannot reverse progress towa rd a democratic 
p o l i t i c a 1 system . The rapidly changing world political 
environme nt has diluted the finite amount of f i nancial 
assistance that could have been considered realistically 
available i n mid--1989 to facilitate Poland' s recovery. 
The 1980 work ers strike led tci the creat io n of the 
So lida r it y trade union a nd the workers right to participate 
in management decisions. A strong union opposed to any 
reduction in its pa rtici pation in management decisions might 
create a situation that limits foreign control of a company, 
and hence investment in Poland. 103 The West appears unwi 11 ing 
to provide additional loans to Poland without some assurance 
that the money will not be wasted as it was in the 1970s. 
The lack of an infrastr uc ture to support a free market 
system, i.e., banks, securities, stock e xchanges, etc., will 
103Robert A. Rankin, "High Stakes in Poland's Gamble to Lure the 
West," San Jose Mercury Ne ws, 26 November 1989, 17. 
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slow the attempt at eliminating the centrally planned economic 
system. These too ls of capitalism must be c r eated before a 
free market system can efficiently operate. The West could 
supply the know how and experience to allow Poland 
to generate thes e prerequisites but only if t he situation in 
Poland will support an adequate return on the i r investment . 
The Solidarity government's attempt to make the Zloty 
fully convert i ble is almost complete. Combined with a 
balanced nat i ona l budget and limited subsidies, Po la nd mayb e 
o n the verg e of so lving the inflation pro b lem. Howe ve r , 
rece nt st r i ke s by railroad workers and mine rs cou ld be a n 
i nd icatio n that t he populat i on is unwi 11 i ng to continue ma k in g 
personal sac r ifi ce s i n support of the governme nt s pol ic ies. 
A de ep re c e ssi o n cau sed b y the immediate effects of the reform 
pa c kage i s a reali st i c po ss ib ility . 
Present l y, t he mos t li kely scenario for Polan d during th e 
ne xt te n ye ars is o ne of lim i ted econom i c recove ry , wit h 
popular resentme nt focused against the regime . Wester n a i d 
w i 11 not 
pro sperit y; 
provide the req u ired assistance t o promote 
i t will not be so meager as to fo s te r instability 
or violent i nt e rn al reactions . The Polish people's toleranc e 
o f a med i oc r e 1 ivi ng standar d is the deci siv e facto r for 
predict i ng t h e natio n 's short term economi c conditions. 
Popular stri kes might lead to increased fina nc i al assistance, 
but th is wi 1 1 be of fset by a dete r ioration in the economic 
conditions result in g from the work stoppage . 
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Po land's history of oppos i tion to foreign ownership and 
domination may restrict the opportunities for i nvestment, 
espec i a 1 1 y for the Germans and Soviets. A wave of German 
investment, especially along Poland's western border, could 
cause resentme nt in the government and mi 1 itary. Mi 1 i ta r y 
opposition to an increased German presence, and hence 
potential threat, could be the catalyst for action against a 
weak government beset by economic stagnation . 
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IV. MILITARY CONDITIONS 
T h i s c h apt e r ' s o b j e c t i v e i s to ex am i n e t h e m i 1 i tar y · s 
influence in Pol an d, and how the mil i ta r y's position ma y 
1 imi t , or enhanc e , the government's ab i 1 i ty to imp 1 ement 
reform prog r ams. Following the pattern of Chap t er I I I on the 
Pol ish economic conditions, three scenarios wi 11 attempt to 
deter m i n e the mos t 1 i k e 1 y d i r e c t i on of Po 1 a nd · s m i 1 i tar y based 
on the presen t i nte rnational conditions. 
The anal ysi s in th i s chapter emphas iz e s a s assessme nt of 
the forces fo r change ve r sus the forces attempti ng to ma i ntain 
t he prese nt si tu a t i on. The questions to be add r essed in 
deta il in c lu de: 
1. What e f f ect will past So v iet training a nd selection for 
advanc eme nt o f se n ior mi 1 itar y off i c e r s ha ve o n the 
Polish mi l itary? 
2. What i s the si ze a nd composition of t he pro- commun is t 
and/or p r o- Sov iet conti ngent in the Pol i sh military? 
3. What is the mi litary's vision of the " new" Polish state? 
4. What are th e rea l istic options and costs for equipping 
the Pol i sh mil itary in the future? 
5. What wil l be the Soviet position regar di ng t he loss of 
Warsaw' s mil i t ary forces and possible a l l i ance with the 
West ? 
A. TRAIN I NG AND SE LECTION 
Polish mi l i ta ry training has bee n i ntegra t e d within the 
Warsaw Pact mi 1 i ta ry doctrine since the earl y 1950s. The 
co nstant repe ti t ion of the assumptio ns and p r a c tices of the 
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Soviet coalition warfare in military schools and political 
i ndoctr i nation makes it second nature to the Po 1 ish career 
soldiers. 104 The requirement to use Russian as the "command 
language" constantly reinforces Soviet doctrine on all senior 
Polish officers. Time in service influences exposure to 
Soviet military philosophy, and might be an indicator of 
expected influence on Polish military actions. 
The Czechoslovakian invasion was a litmus test for Pol ish 
generals, all officers who refused to participate in the 
operation were forcibly retired. 105 The senior Polish officers 
are isolated from the populat i on because of their obligation 
and loyalty to the USSR. 106 The most senior officers entered 
the military while fighting on the Eastern Front during World 
Wa r I I and can be expected to retire within the next decade. 
Ha v i ng apparently accepted the non-communist gov ernment's 
assumption of political power in 1989; it is likely that only 
a Soviet prompting or a deterioration 1n the nation's 
stability could provoke this group to attempt a coup. 
Junior officers have lost pride in a military career and 
a rigorous recruiting program has been instituted to meet 
104Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, East European Military 
Reliability (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, October 1986), 52. 
105A. Ross Johnson and Barbara Kliszewski, The Polish Military 
After Martial Law: Report of a Rand Conference (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, June 1983), 17. 
106 J. F. Brown, Po 1 and S i nee Marti a 1 Law (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, December 1988), 23. 
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shortases of "su itable" officer candidate applications . 107 A 
reduction 1n mi 1 itary strength wi 11 result in a smaller but 
more efficient force, and with the Party sti 11 controlling the 
Ministry of Defense it can be expected that se 1 ect ion of 
officers wi 11 be a carefully made decision. 108 The officers 
who have entered the military since 1980 have been exposed to 
the ideals of democracy before entering the service, but are 
too junior to inf luence the decision making process. 
Middle grade officers will fill the critica l positions in 
the coming decade . These officers were selected by the regime 
as it attempted to ensure reliability of the officer corps by 
careful recruitme nt involving political selection, pre-
military trainin g, and substantial material incentives. 109 
Since the change of government requests for dismissals have 
increased as off icer s seem to feel that an a rmy career is a 
dead end rather t han a cha 11 enge. 11 0 The officers remaining 
in the military could be staying as a resu lt of a sense of 
patriotic duty and loyalty to the motherland, and hence form 
the backbone of a future Polish military free of political 
influence. 
107
"Problems Facing Polish Army," Jane's Defense Weekly, 
11 February 1989, 23 2; Brown, Poland Since Martial Law, 22. 
108"CFE Could Lead to Regular 
Week 1 y , 2 3 Dec embe r 1 9 8 9 , 1 3 8 1 . 
Army," Jane's Defense 
109Alexiev, East European Military Reliab i l i ty, v. 
110M at t h i as P 1 u g g e , " I n Trans i t i on : The Po 1 i s h 




Officer entrants to the Polish military were subjected to 
one of the most pervasive indoctrination and control systems 
ever designed. 111 Most senior officers are eager for political 
change; but the military is still integrated with the Party, 
as a political organization, and as an instrument of Party 
power the m i 1 i tary is not prone to change. 112 Beginning in 
early 1990, all political activity 1n the mi 1 itary was 
abolished; in the name of preserving combat effectiveness. 113 
This action potentially could i solate service members from the 
effect of external forces and help prolong the Party as the 
dominate social epistemology i n the military. 
The v e r y f act t h at aft e r 4 0 year s of c omm u n i s t r u 1 e , 
military loyalty to the Party is still in doubt testifies to 
the limited success of the politicization of the Polish youth. 
From the Party's pers pective, the military's record of 
suppressing i nterna 1 disturbances 1 s not encouraging: at 
Pozan in 1956 troops refused to disperse the riote r s and some 
e ven joined them, in 1970 the army disobeyed an order to use 
overwhelming force against the demonstrators, and during the 
price increase protests in Lodz and Warsaw in 1976 Jaruzelski 
111 A 1 e x i ev, East European M i 1 i tary Re 1 i ab i 1 i ty, 28. 
112P 1 ugge, " In Transition: The Po 1 ish Armed Fo r ces," 133. 
113
"Defense Body Rejects Party Affiliation in Army," FBIS -
EEU, 21 February 1990, 45. 
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lS reported to have said "Pol ish soldiers wi 1 1 not fire on 
Polish workers."1 14 
In summary, the Polish military appears to be pro-Soviet, 
but not pro-Party at the senior levels. The junior officers 
are at least anti-Party, if not anti-Soviet. The conflicting 
aspirations of the different levels of the military could 
result in a lac k of mi 1 itary action, regardless of the 
political and economic situation in Poland. 
B. MILITARY VISION 
The officer pu r ge following the Arab-Is r a e li 1967 War and 
the 1968 Czech oslovakian invasion, removed those officers who 
were not comp 1 ete 1 y 1 oya 1 to the Party. 115 S i nee the purges, 
the surviving off i cers have reached the highest levels in the 
Polish military. These senior officers in the Polish army 
have a significant history of supporting the Soviet Union and 
communism; i.e . , "the fewer the stars, the 1 ower the adherence 
to the communist regime. " 116 
In 1970 the mili tar y was willing to use limited force to 
quell riots and in December 1981 the army effectively broke 
up Solidarity's organization within two weeks of declaring 
martial law. Articles in the Pol ish press prior to, and 
114Dale R. Herspring, "The Polish Military and the Policy 
Process," Background to Crisis, Maurice D. Simon and Roger E 
Kanet ed. (Boulder : Westview Press, 1981), 228. 
115Kolankiewicz, Poland, 142. 
116Johnson, The Pol ish Mi 1 itary After Mart i al Law, 22. 
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immediately after, martial law was introduced strongly tied 
the military's justification for ex·isting with the 
preservation of a socialist state. 117 
The career and economic i ncentives of a military career 
have been reinforced by a 1 ifetime of political incentives for 
these officers. Having had a taste of political power 
when the country was under martial law, the professional cadre 
had an enhanced perception of their personal interest in the 
rna i ntenance of the system. 118 It must be remembered that in 
the 1920s the Pol ish military staged a successfu l coup, as a 
reaction to dete riorating domestic conditions, as they were 
being forced out of government positions by po 1 it i c i ans. 
Their ma1n objective was to preserve the e xisting state of 
affairs. 119 
Counterbalancing the senior military officers are the mid-
grade ranks who have not been fully integrated into the So vi et 
command structure. These younger officers are more skeptical 
about lo yal ty than officers who served in earlier periods of 
117
" Army Da i 1 y Art i c 1 e on State Interests, Soviet 
Alliance," FB IS -EEU, 13 November 1980, 1-4; "Military Daily 
Questions Definition of 'Democracy' , " FB I S-EEU, 3 December 
1980, G20-1; "Army Da i 1 y Appea 1 s for End to 'Anarchy', 
'Disarray'," FBIS-EEU, 23 December 1980, G16-7.; "Commentary 
on Need to Restore Milia Credibility," FBIS-EEU, 15 May 1981, 
G14-5. 
118Rakowska-Harmstone, War s aw Pact, 84. 
119Andrziy Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations in Poland 
Betwee n the Wars: 1918-1939," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 
1988' 181 . 
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communist ru 1 e. 120 Ref 1 ect i ng a change 1 n governments, the 
mi 1 itary oat h chan ged to "faithfully serve the nation . 
in brotherhood of arms with allied armies," replacing the oath 
of "defense of the peop 1 e' s government 
a 1 1 i ance wit h the Soviet army. " 121 
The mi 1 itary is in a difficult sit u a tion. 
and fraterna 1 
The mi 1 i tary 
wi 11 want to ensure it retains its position as the "protector" 
of the Polis h peopl e. As time passes and the present senior 
officers ret i re, th e Pol ish mi 1 itary wi 11 probably become less 
pro-Soviet and act in accordance with its view of Po 1 and's 
nation a 1 inte r es ts. 
C. EQUIPPING MI LI TARY FORCES 
Before the options and costs of mainta ini ng the Polish 
armed forces can be contemplated, the probable threat faced 
by the nat io n mus t be defined. For the purpose of this 
anal y sis the external threat faced by Poland may come from a 
reun i fied Ge rman y, or ethnic violence along the border with 
Lithuania a nd 1n the Balkans spilling ove r international 
borders. Interna l ly the military may b e forced to restore 
publ i c orde r, us in g the authority of the elected government, 
if the economic conditions continue to deteriorate and civil 
security forces are incapable of dealing with the situation. 
120 A 1 e x i e v , Eas t European M i 1 i tar y R e 1 i a b i 1 i t y , 2 7 1 • 
121
"Prob lems Faci ng Polish Army," Jane's Defense Wee kly, 
11 February 1989, 232. 
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Soviet coa 1 it ion strategy ca 11 s for non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
forces is to fight in formations comprising distinct national 
elements alongside Soviet forces, but not forged into a single 
army. 122 This inherited mi 1 itary structure of the Pol ish army 
wil 1 be adequate to counter the threats posed above. Poland 
is not strong enough to defend itself against potential German 
m i 1 i tary aggression without the active support of a 11 i es; 
realistically the Polish military must be structured for 
fighting in a coalition . 
The 1950s industrialization effo r t produced an adequate 
arms production capacity to supply the Polish military, while 
allowing for significant military exports. Poland is capable 
of producing: armored personal carriers, light airplanes, 
helicopters, self pro-pelled artillery, minor warships, tanks, 
along with personal weapons a n d ammunition. 123 Between 1981 
and 1985 Poland imported $2. 5 3 billion and e x ported $2.65 
billion in military equipment and from 1984-88 Poland was the 
ninth leading exporter of military equipment to the industrial 
wor 1 d. 124 
122 1 van Vo 1 gyes, "The Warsaw Pact: Change in Structure 
and Function," Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1989, 556. 
123Ex tracted from S I PR I Yearbook 1989, Appendix c; and 
Hogg Jane's Infantry Weapons 1989-90, 15th Ed., ed. I an V. 
(United Kingdom: Jane's Defense Data, 1989) 
124wor 1 d M i 1 i tary and 
(Washingto n , D.C.: Ed., 
SIPRI 
1989)' 
Yearbook 1989 (New 
198. 
Social Ex penditures 1987-88, 12th 
World Priorities, 1987), 12; and 
York: Oxford Univers i ty Press, 
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As demonstrated in Table 2 on the following page, the 
Jaruzelski government continued a comm itment to military 
strength with arms exports during the 1980s. 
TABLE 2 
VALUE OF POLAND'S ARMS TRANSFERS, 
TOTAL IMPORTS, AND EXPORTS 
(CON STANT 1987 BILLION DO LLARS) 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Arm lmpt .30 . 51 .94 1 . 1 1 . 0 . 51 1 . 1 1 . 2 .73 
Tot lmpt 27.2 27.0 20 .0 17.2 17.9 18. 1 18.5 21 . 9 11 . 2 
Ratio 
Arms/Tot . 0 1 .02 .05 .06 .06 .03 .06 .05 .07 
Arm Expt .82 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 4 .80 
Tot Expt 25.3 24. 1 17. 1 18 . 0 18.6 18.9 18.8 22.4 12.2 
Ratio 
Ar ms /Tot .0 3 .05 .08 . 06 .06 .06 .07 .06 .07 
---------------- -- ------------------------- ---- ------------
Data Source: World Militar:t E x ~enditures a nd Arms Tr ansfers 
1988 ( Washing ton, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1989) 
The collapse of the Polish economy during the late 1970s 
and continuing t h rough the 1980s severel y limits the state 
resources th at can be allocated for militar y funding . If 
Poland is to maintain its current level of military hardware 
during a period of budgetary restraint, the policy of 
increasing the active duty troop strength while cutting the 
reserve strength must be reversed. l25 
125Jeffery Simon, "Naot and Warsaw Pact Institutional 
Developments," NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mob il ization, ed. 
Jeffery Simo n (Was h ington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1988), 36. 
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In 1989 the defense budget was reduced by 4% and manpower 
expend i tures were cut by 12%, a possible indication of a 
concerted effort to maintain equipment stocks whi l e reducing 
the budget. 126 Tab 1 e 3 is a comparison of the potentia 1 costs 
associated with reequipping the Polish army over the next ten 
years based on the army being rna i nta i ned at the projected 
force levels achieved with the announced military reductions 
for 1990. The three sources o f suppliers selected , the USSR, 
the U.S., or a combination of non-superpower nations, covers 
the spectrum of cost and sophistication available i n the arms 
market. In reequipping the Polish military it i s assumed that 
domestic arms productio n capability will be maintained, 
elimi nating the need to completely depend on external 
suppliers for national security. 
TABLE 3 
REPLACEMENT ESTIMATES FOR POLISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT 
Tanks AIRCRAFT APC's 
UNITED STATES+ 
model numbe r cost model number cost model number cost 
M-48 1800 1300 F/A-18 350 23750 M- 113 1800 495 
M-1 300 785 C-130 50 1500 M-2A1 900 1040 
Total Cost 28,865 
126
" De f en s e B u d get A 1 1 o cat i on s E x am i ned , " F B I S- E E U , 8 
February 1990, 58; "Two-Year Ti metable for Pol i sh Troop Cuts," 
Jane's Defense Weekly, 28 November 1989, 973. 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
USSR# 
T-72 2100 19 53 Mi g-29 350 8050* Man y 2700 609 
An-28 50 100 
Total Cost 10,812 
VARIOUS SUPPLIERS+ 
Scorpion Mirage N/A 
(GB) 1800 1824 2000 350 29167 
Leopa r d I I 
(GER) 300 96 0 
Total Cost 3 1951 
#Soviet prices in 1988 dollars with a $1=Z300 conversion 
rate and prices are for the equipment without the cost of 
maintenance or a r ming the weapon system 
+ Western equipment prices include the maintenance and 
training program as well as some armaments for the weapon 
system 
* Mig-29 price is for used version in 1990 dollar price 
Data Sources : S I PR I Yearbook 1989; Annua 1 Report to the 
Congress Fiscal Year 1988; and Douglas Barrie and Joris 
Janssen Lok, "Western De a 1 ers Seek Soviet Arms," Jane's 
Defe nse Weekly, 6 January 1990. 
Poland's gove r nment is attempting to develop a new 
military doctrin e which will stress: cuts in the defense 
budgets, shifting resources to the c i vi 1 ian sector, and a 
reduction in the size of the armed forces . This will be 
combined with a new emphasis on defensive duties and an 
increase in the portion of mi 1 itary forces designated for 
internal fronts. 127 With an army organizationa l restructuring 
to make the br_igade size unit the basic mi 1 itary building 
block for combi ned arms formation already underway, the 
127
"Po 1 and Set to Cut Budget, Force Strength," Jane's 
Defense Weekly , 9 September 1989, 437. 
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opportun i ty to shift suppliers, if desired, 
available. 
is readily 
Poland's econom1c ability to reequip its military will be 
severely restricted during the next decade. A sma 1 1 er army 
geared to self-defense, but part of a coalition might allow 
Poland to reduce its defense spending while maintaining its 
national security. Without foreign assistance Poland does not 
appear to have the ability to reequip its forces. 
D. SOVIET POSITION 
The Soviet Union's renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine 
and apparent acceptance of the pol itica 1 1 iberation of Eastern 
Europe must be considered with i n the security requirements of 
the Soviet Union. Stalin told Churchill at Yalta: "To 
Britain, Poland is a question of honor; to the Sov iet Union 
it is a question of both honor and security. " 128 It is hard to 
understand how the prospect of a unified Germany , domestic 
economic stagnation, and internal ethnic unrest; combined with 
an independent and possibly hostile Poland can enhance Soviet 
security in the near term. In the long-term a resurgent USSR, 
with mutually sought after lin ks with an independent Poland, 
conceivably would be 1n a more secure position. 
The Soviet Army's northern group commander, General 
Dubinin, has been quoted as saying that the Red Army is in 
favor of pulling out of Poland if the Soviet forces in East 
128w e r t h , Rus s i a at Wa r 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 5 , 9 7 4 . 
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Germany are withd r aw n. 129 A Kremlin spokesman has also 
expressed a willingness to discuss the continued presence of 
Soviet troops in Poland if the Polish government expressed the 
appro p r i ate des i r e . 130 However , Gene r a 1 Jar u z e 1 s k i and P r i me 
Minister Mazow i ec k i have ca 11 ed for the So v ie t troops to 
remain in Poland unti 1 a treaty providing Po l and "adequate" 
assurances against any possible future Germa n aggression is 
signed. 131 
An uneasy b al ance of power between the reformist 
government and the Party has kept the discuss i o n of treaty 
membership off of the political agenda in Poland. 132 The WTO 
was not capable o f operating as an extension of the Soviet 
Armed Forces befo re 1989, and with the change s of government 
throughout Easter n Europe the effectiveness of the Pact is 
signif icantly lowe r 1n 1 9 9 0 . 133 Poland' s ri c h mar tial 
traditio n , large mil i tary forces, and strategi c positio n 
astride the Ge r man- Soviet axis could ma k e Po l and the f r ont 
line member of an y new military alliance syst em i n Europe. 
129
"Daily C i tes So vi et Troop Withdrawal Of fe r," FBIS-EE U, 
21 February 1990, 42. 
130 John lams, "Soviets Offer to Pull Forces from Polan d." 
Monterey Hera 1 d, 12 February 1990, 1. 
131
"Jaruzelsk i Supports Soviet Troop Withdrawal," 
FBIS-EEU, 13 Febr ua ry 1990, 50. 
132
"warsaw Pac t Assess the Effects of Reform, " Jane's 
Defense Week ly , 28 October 1989, 925. 
133simon, NATO-W arsaw Pact Force Mob i l ization, 45. 
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Allied with the USSR, Poland provides access to Cent ral 
Europe; aligned against the Soviets or neutral, Poland 
isolates Moscow from European affairs. The reuni f ication of 
Germany appears to hold the key to Poland's military future. 
A Germany strong 1 y bonded to a Western a 11 i ance sho u 1 d dictate 
to Moscow a fundamental desi r e for a robust Po l ish-Soviet 
relationship. A unified Germany loosely tied to the West 
might force Warsaw to search for a powerful ally to deter 
demands for a resettlement of the post World War II Polish 
western frontier. A German-Soviet partnership coul d force 
Poland to align with the West to avoid a repetit ion of the 
events in August-September 19 3 9. 
E. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
1. Alliance with United States 
This scenario assumes Poland is unable to 
satisfactorily settle the border question with a reunified 
Germa ny. The Sov iet Union is not able to su pply the 
assurances Warsaw requires due to internal problems . The U.S . 
"guarantees" Poland's borders as a hedge against a collapse 
of NATO and to ensure influence in a Europe that is moving 
toward unification. Strong cultural links and a common goal 
of maintaining stability in Central Europe allow an American-
Polish partnership to develop. For this scenario to unfold 
a close U.S.-Polish military relationship will have to form 
almost instantly to allow effective cooperation. 
6 1 
Moreover, fo r this scenar1o to develop, Poland will have 
to alter its tactics, doctrine, and equipment to merge with 
American practices . The past decade of economic stagnation 
w i 1 1 prevent the government in Warsaw from devoting the 
resources necessary for restructuring of the armed forces. 
America must either reduce the costs of Polish equipment or 
subsidize the final cost to allow Poland to effectively rearm 
itself. The sen ior leadership of the military will have to 
be rep 1 aced to 
sharp drop in 
eliminate their pro-Soviet orientation. A 
immediately after 
military effectiveness can 
the organizational changes 
be expected 
begin to be 
implemented . 
I t will take time for the new military leadership to 
adjust to the ir positions and become acquainted with American 
methods. Trained to fight the Western armies, it ca n be 
e xpe c ted that a majority of the Polish military is at least 
familiar with bas i c Western military practices and equipment. 
The most da ngerous 
mi 1 itary is near l y 
Soviet and Amer i can 
point for Poland wi 11 come whe n 
equa 11 y equipped and tra ine d with 




massive upheava 1 in the rest of Eastern Europe and the USSR 
as local economies continue to deteriorate while shifting to 
a capitalist market system. 
2. Neutra 1 
For Poland to remain neutral will r equire a treaty 
guaranteeing Poland's western frontier and a unified Germany 
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strongly tied to the West. Without both condit i ons Poland 
would have to be prepared to defend itself against a situation 
s i m i 1 a r to W or 1 d War 1 1 • 134 
As a neutral like Austria, Poland could expect to 
reduce its mi 1 itary expenditures while devoting more resources 
toward economic recovery. Depoliticalization of the military 
could be more effective, since the only reason for remaining 
in the armed services wou 1 d be to defend the home 1 and. The 
gee-strategic importance of Po l and to both the USSR and Europe 
would ma ke this scenario diff i cult to accompli sh. With the 
second largest population, Po l and as a neutral wou ld create 
a tremendous power vacuum in the center of Europe . 
I f Po 1 and became a n e u t r a 1 f o 1 1 ow i n g the S wed i s h 
e xample, it could e xpect to maintain nearly as l arge of a 
milita r y a s it does toda y. This will prevent resources from 
being s hi fted to the c i vi 1 ian sector and becau se of the 
obso 1 esce nce of most of the Po 1 ish hardware, co u 1 d end up 
bei ng the mo st e xpensive optio n in the short-t erm. Poland has 
demo nstrated in the past tha t it cannot mi 1 itari ly defend 
itself against its enemies. Without the 1 uxury of weak 
neighbors or geograph i ca 1 i so 1 at ion, Po 1 and does not have the 
capability to enforce its neut r ality in European conflicts. 
1 ~Given the conditions of today it is not rea l istic for 
Poland to reform the economy, create a new democratic 
government, and militarily eq ui p itself to defe nd against a 
larger and militarily stronge r nation. A Germa ny allied with 
the Sov iet Union, even if accepted by the West, would place 
Poland in a situation nearly ident ical to 1939. 
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3. Allied with the Soviet Union 
This scenario assumes Poland's pro-Soviet faction 
overcomes any hostility towards the USSR by using the threat 
of a resurgent Germany. A "guarantee" of the Polish borders 
cou 1 d overcome the negative aspects of a continued Soviet 
presence. Common military doctrine and tactics developed over 
45 years wou 1 d not be rep 1 aced and the senior mi 1 i tary 
officers could be retained. 
Poland al r ead y produce under So vi et license: tan ks, 
planes, and smal l arms. The most ef fi cient use of these 
plants in t he short-term would be to continue prod ucin g the 
same hardwa r e . To decrease the defense burde n , the military 
could be made to be self-supporting. With the logistical and 
tra in i ng p ipeline for Soviet equipment already in place, 
short-term saving would be greater. 
This scenar i o is the most desirable for the So vi et 
military. Pol and as a major purchaser of equipment will allow 
Moscow to continue using economies of scale and low er their 
hardware costs. Poland's shipbuilding indust ry can suppl y the 
small combatants required by both natio ns , freeing the USSR 
to build large naval vessels. Technology bar r iers to the USSR 
might not be invoked against Poland, allowing acces s to 
necessary techno l ogy that might otherwise be unavailable. 
Keeping a barrier between the USSR and Europe would filter out 
some of t he undesired Western influences before the y reach 
Moscow. 
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F. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The three mi 1 itary scenar1os above and the i ssues analyzed 
in part two of this chapter are used to generate a hierarchy 
of probable developments within the military. 
1. Training and Selection 
Forty-five years of Soviet training and control of the 
officer selection process will not be eradicated until the 
middle grade officers leave the service at the very earliest . 
The cultural dislike and memories of the Sovi et inspired 
Commun i st milita ry with its role in maintaining the regimes 
s t a b i 1 i t y w i 1 1 p r event t h e USSR f rom r e t a i n i n g Po 1 and as a 
strong military ally. 
2. Military Vision 
The leadership of the military has a vested interest 
1n maintaining their positio n in Polish society a nd will not 
be en thusiastic about c i v i 1 ian inspired programs that threaten 
the ir pr ivileged status. A mi litary alliance with the U.S. 
would make their So v iet training valueless and hence increase 
the ease of removing them from office. The lower ranks will 
not accept a tight alliance with the Soviet Union. Neutrality 
will allow Poland to pick and choose among the available 
options and 1ncrease the governments freedom to maneuver in 
the short term. 
3. Equipment Costs 
This decision was made almost solel y on the savings 
accrued from remai ning tied to Soviet supplie d equipment. 
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Po land cannot af for d the e xpense of defe nse e xp e ndi tu res , 
especially during the transition process to a free market 
system. An addi ti onal factor in valuing th e U.S. alliance 
over neutra lity is the possible support Poland could acquire 
against the threat f rom a unified Germany attemptin g to regain 
the territory l os t in 1945. 
4. Soviet Pos i tion 
The Sovie t 's desire for Poland to rema i n aligned wi th 
Mosco w is o bvi ous ly very high. An American all y on the Sov i et 
borde r might be des i rab 1 e i n Moscow to ens ure a resurgent 
Germa ny wou 1 d not be ab 1 e to at tac k the US SR without U.S. 
involvement. A neu t ra 1 Po 1 and wou 1 d fo rce the Soviets to 
consi de r Warsaw as a poss ible threat, fe aring a s udde n switch 
of all eg iance in time of cr isis. Moscow likes the futu r e to 
be p r e dictable and a neutral Poland would not be a stable 
situation in the long t erm . 
G. CONCLUSION 
The most real is tic scenario i s f or Poland to stay aligned 
with the Soviet Un io n, but wit h neutralit y being a viable 
alternative. The pr ob abili ty of Poland becom in g aligned with 
the United States is remote under the present cond i tions. 
However, politica l control of the armed forces will ultimately 
force the military to directly compete aga ins t social and 
economic pro grams for limited funding. With cont in ued 
democ ratiz ation, the mi 1 itary wi 11 1 ikely see an immediate 
dec rease in its abi lity to influence th e political budgetary 
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proces s. This could shift the military hierarch y strongly 
toward neutral i ty and eve n ma ke an alliance with the United 
States possible in the next decade. 
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V. CURRENT POLITICAL RESTRAINTS 
This chapter assess the current po l itica l conditions 1n 
Poland. The US SR has had over forty years to estab 1 ish 
bureaucrat i c ties with Warsaw beyond the identifiable Party-
to-Par ty affiliat i ons. The Soviets might use these "hidden" 
contacts to ret a i n direct contact wit h the new Polish 
gover nment, and pe rh aps gain more leverage t han in the past 
since the ties wi ll not be as obvious. The format wil 1 follow 
the economic and po litical chapters. The critical questions 
to be add r essed in detai 1 include: 
A. INTERNAL 
1. What wi ll be the political appeal/imp act of the Pol i sh 
commun i s t /soc ialist party (s) in a democr atic po litical 
system? 
2. Do the non - c ommunist leaders and popul ati on of Poland 
rea 1 i ze t he costs i nvo 1 ved in estab 1 i s h i ng a democratic 
and capita li stic (free market) system? Realistically, 
are they will ing to pay those costs ? 
3. How will th e strong influence of the Catholic Church 
affe c t Po l a nd ' s f uture? 
B. EXTERNAL 
1. How wi ll t he border/ethnic rivalries bet ween Poland and 
its neighbo r s affect the Soviet ' s abi li ty to influence 
the reg i on or ma i ntain alliances by sup porting specific 
claims? 
2. What are t he European and Japanese rea c t i ons to events 
in Eastern Europe and how wi 1 1 their p o 1 i c i es and 
obje c tives a f fect American efforts? 
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C. COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN POLAND 
In the wake of its overwhelming victory in the June 1989 
national elections, Solidarity was able to form a coalition 
government with the support of the Democratic, and United 
Peasant Parties. The Communist Party was racke d by a 
prevailing mood of apathy and disillusionment during the rest 
of the yea r as it faced the unpleasant situation of no longer 
holding undivi ded power. 1 ~ Splitting into two new politic a l 
parties in January 1990, the former Po 1 ish communist b 1 ock 
cannot be considered a monolithic block in future elections. 
Still, the former Commu n ists represent over 1.1 mil lion 
vot e rs, out of 21 million votes cast in the last electio n.~~ 
The Social-Democrat ic Union of the Pol ish Republic (USRP) 
represent s a hard line communist ideology . Denouncing 
"art ificial unit y " the USRP rejected being "t ransformed into 
Social Democrats out of Communists o vern ight. " 137 The Social 
Democrac y of the Republic of Poland (SDRP) was formed under 
t he lead ership of Aleksandr Kwasni ews ki , and co ntains the 
majority of the 165 communist party par 1 i ament 13P members. · " 
~ 35 "Rakowski on Nati on's Disil l usionment'," FBIS-EE U, 1 Februar y 
1990, 47 . 
136
"statistical Analysis of Candidate Affiliations, " FB!S-EEU, 
7 June 1989, 37; "Rakows ki Issues Statement on New Party," FBIS-
EEU, 17 January 1990, 59 . 
137
"communists Form New Polis h Party," San Jose Mercury News, 
29 Januar y 1990, 7. 
138
"Kwasniewski: Social Democracy Supports Mazowiecki," FBIS-
EEU, 8 Feb ruary 1990, 8. 
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The r e 1s no differ e nce in the platforms of the SDRP and USRP 
parties. 139 Because no real split has occurred, to retain 
contro 1 So 1 i dar it y' s co a 1 it ion must retain enough votes to 
stand up to the combined strength of the two parties. ~ 
In any event, t h ese two left wing politica l parties could 
be in a position to influence the new democratic government 
well out of proportion to their absolute strength during the 
next ten years . In a parliament evenly divided between two 
political all i ances, a small but tightly organized bloc k of 
representatives co u ld play a crucial role in the formatio n of 
a new go ve r nme nt . A small election turnout wi l l a llow gr eater 
representation f or a small, but active pol i tical party; 
increasing the pr obability of the left wi ng rega i ning 
significant polit ical power in Poland. 
The c o al ition of the Commun i st Pa r t y a nd i ts pa r tners 
received about 25 percent of the Senate vote s and 48 percent 
o f the national li st of candidates: a sig n ificant minority of 
14' the June voters . · · Well organized and wi t h a bureaucratic 
institutio n already established, the former communist party 
membership cou l d e l ect a small number of sena t ors to the Sejm 
~ 39 
"Fiszbach Interviewed on New Party," FB I S-EEU, 8 February 
1990, 9 . 
HQ " l . 1 ' d . t ' 
-· Wa esa V1ew s So 1 ar1 y s Future Political Role," FB IS-
EEU, 7 Ma r ch 1990, 64. 
l4:"Politburo Report Presented to 13th Plenum," FB IS-EEU, 8 
August 1989, 38 . 
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1n the next election. A cont i nued weak economic performance 
under Solidarity and an open split in the trade union's 
leadership over future policy options could make this a likely 
scenario in the next elections. 
Increased political freedom without econom1c discipline 
may prove to be a mixed b 1 ess i ng to Po 1 and. 142 B 1 amed for the 
nation's economic problems, t he Communists might be able to 
use popu 1 ar discontent in the face of continued economic 
difficultie s under the new government to regain political 
acceptabilit y. Communism alone cannot be blamed for Poland's 
dismal economic performance compared to the rest of the East 
Bloc nations. 143 However, before the former communist 
leadership can stage a comeback the new parties must 
realistically determine the i r role in Poland's future, and 
then establi sh a creditable po s ition in society to a chieve the 
desired po 1 it i ca 1 program. 144 
D. COST OF DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 
The changes that occurred during the last year are a start 
towards forming a democratic political system with a free 
market economic system. With the PUWP being guaranteed 173 
142Thomas H. Naylor, "Poles Will Die for Poland 
York Times, 6 July 1989, 21. 
. , 
143weak po 1 it i ca 1 1 eader ship combined with the popu 1 at ions 
unwillingness to accept or allow necessary price reforms in 1970, 
1976, and 1980 have contributed to Poland's present condition. 
144
"Levin on Problems Facing Polish Communists , " FBIS-EEU, 19 
September 1989, 30. 
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seats out of 460 in the lower house of the national assemb ly, 
"true" democracy has not yet reached the Po 1 ish peop 1 e. It 
has been estimated that only ten percent of society is active 
in Po l and's polit i cal life and less than sixty-five percent 
of the eligible voters participated in the June 1989 
e 1 ect ion. 145 The new coa 1 it ion government has quite vu 1 nerab 1 e 
support, since the political support rests on a pluralism of 
polit i cal viewpo i nts, artificially consol i dated in the 
So 1 i dar i t y t r ad e u n i on . 146 
The goal of ousting the communist dictatorship u ni ted the 
oppos i tio n ; the Polish people did not vote for Solidarity and 
its program as much as it voted against the PUWP. ·47 Since 
gaining control of the government, Solidarit y has had t o 
correct major economi c prob 1 ems without the communi st presence 
a s a rall ying point. Because Solidarit y did not e x pect, or 
desire, to cont rol the legislature following the June 
elect i ons there was no program ready fo r immediate 
145"POL I TYKA on Evo 1 vi ng Po 1 it i ca 1 A 1 i gnments," FBI S-EE U, 30 
March 1990, 46. 
146
"Trust in Government, Solidarity Seen Dec lin ing," FBIS-EEU, 
26 March 1990, 44. 
147
"orzechowski Remarks on Elections," FBI S-EEU, 7 June 1989, 
37; John Tagiliabue , "How to Be Big Winner : Just Make No 
Promises," New York Times, 23 June 1989, 4; "Pol itburo Report 
Presented to 13th Plenum," FBIS-EEU, 8 August 1989, 33; "POLITYKA 
on Evolving Political Alignments," FBIS-EEU, 30 March 1990, 45; 
"Walesa Interviewe d on Solidarity's Political Power," FBIS-EEU, 2 
April 1990, 44. 
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implementat i on . 148 Not su r pri sin gl y , the popular i ty of the 
Solidarity government has dropped since tak ing off ic e as they 
strugg 1 e with the country's enduring prob 1 ems. 149 
Solidarity's political pl a tform is aimed at a c hieving an 
indepe n dent and sovereign nation in a reconstit u ted 
repub 1 i c . 150 However, achieving these objectives in the 1 ong-
term will require economic success. Sociopol i tical and 
economic reforms will only hav e a chance for success if Pola n d 
can rela tively q u ick ly restor e economic eq uil ib rium . 1 5 ~ 
Removing the Commu nist Party's constitutio n al monopoly o n 
pol itical power was the fi r st step towar d ac h ie ving a n 
independent rep ub 1 i c. Unt i 1 the German borde r iss ue is 
res o l ved, th e i n dependence an d sovereignty of Pol an d wil 1 be 
co n s t rained b y the prese nc e of Soviet troops in Poland. No 
n a t i o n c a n b e con sidered comp letely indepe ndent whe n its 
ter ritorial integrity depends on a cont i nuo us military 
alliance presence. 
A Fe brua ry 19 90 two-thirds of the respondents opposed 
add itiona l unemployme nt and 25 percent did not thi nk that the 
148
"walesa Interviewed o n Solidarity's Political Power," FB IS-
EEU , 2 April 1990, 44 . 
H9 "Po11 Cla ims Solidarity Losing Support," FB IS-EEU, 6 Februar y 
1990, 57 . 
150
" Kuron Interviewed on Solidarity Platform," FBIS-EEU, 1 May 
1989, 44. 
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government ha d a good ide a of how the r.-~arket functioned. 152 In 
particular, the peasants are not happy with the reforms and 
unres t in rural areas is the most serious internal danger the 
government w i 11 have to face. 1S3 In the past economic 
condi tions caused po 1 it i ca 1 tensions, preventi n g the PUWP from 
implementing even mo dest economic reforms. 
In a democracy political visions must be allowed to 
develop, regardless of ideological orientatio n. 1 ~ Political 
plura li sm broadly conceived is a logical reflection of the 
real differences, dis c rep ancies, and divisions in soc iety . 155 
So 1 i dar i t y ' s co he s i v en e s s w i 1 1 most 1 i k e 1 y weaken w i t h t i me 
as various factio n s attempt to ach iev e i ndividual objectives 
following the elimination of the communist government. An y 
Solidarity go vernment wil l be weakest d uring the transition 
period as i t becomes a political party a nd not a trade union. 
The center a nd r ight wing elements of the trade union will 
compete t o gain t he lar gest number of fol l owe rs possible among 
th e div id in g membership. 
152
"opi ni on Poll Re su l ts on Unemployment , Prices," FBIS-EEU, 
March 1990, 48. 
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"POLITYKA on Ev olving Political Alignments , " FBIS-EEU, 30 
March 1990, 46; "Farmers, Fearing a Drop in Prices Criticize 
Po land's Economi c P lan ," New York Times, 19 December 1989, 16. 
154The e xc e pti on to this general rule is a ideology that 
preve n ts societ y fr om cant i nu i ng a function a 1 existence. Thes e 
must be examined o n a case by case bas is and not be eliminated 
because they are not "popular" with the rul ing elite. 
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Without coalition support, Solidarity presently cannot 
prevent the former PUWP representatives from blocking programs 
aimed at solving the nation's problems. Holding national 
elections before the 1995 requirement could increase the 
possibility of reforms being sacrificed for political 
survival. Thus, Solidarity is faced with a difficult 
situation; unable to implement all of its desired reforms 
without compromising to maintain its political a l liance, and 
risking the collapse of the present reform package because of 
political promises made during an election campaign to gain 
the simple majority required to form a new government. 
Poland's history of political development offers an 
unsettling prospect for alternatives to overcome the present 
problems. Following the formation of the Second Polish 
Republic in 19 18, the nation was unable to tolerate wi dely 
different political positions; in the face of ris i ng economic 
unrest and political anarchy a successful coup established a 
mi 1 itar y dictatorship. 156 
If Solidarit y, or any other political alliance, cannot 
maintain control, the military may retake political power to 
prevent a complete collapse o f the country's government. The 
precedent for mi 1 itary actio n in 1926 and again i n 1981 are 
a constant reminder of Poland's potential for a military 
dictatorship. 
156Andrzej Korbonski, "Civ i l-Military Relations in Poland 
Between the Wars: 1918-1939," 17 4. 
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E. ROLE OF CATHOLIC CHURCH 
The Catholic Church has been seen as a defender of Polish 
culture during per i ods of foreign domination, and represents 
one of the few threads of continuity throughout Po 1 and's 
history. 1 ~ The Ch u rch's position in Poland c h anged radically 
as the result o f the massive demographic transformation 
res u 1 t i n g from Wo r 1 d War I I . Only 500,000 out of Poland's 
post-war populat i o n of 24 mi 11 ion were "national minorities"; 
mak i ng the new state almost e xclusively Catholic. 158 The 
Church regarded it self as represe nting the Po l ish natio n on 
the basis of his t orical status, and pop u lar allegiance. 1~ 
The PUWP an d the Church have been in an ideo 1 og i ca 1 
struggle since t h e PUWP consolidated its h o l d on power . A 
1949 Vatica n decree excommunicated Catholics who followed and 
tau g h t Communi s t doctrine, denying t h e sac rament s t o an y 
"cons ciously a n d fr eely" supporting Commu ni st a c t ivi ties . The 
agreement between the Polish Republic and t h e Episcopate of 
Poland, 14 Apr i l 1950 , guaranteed the c l ergy's political 
lo yal t y to the go vernme n t in return for a declarat i o n to 
respect the Chur ch' s right to operate in Po 1 and. 160 
l57oav i es, God 's P 1 aygro u nd a Hi story of Po 1 and , 208 . 
~8 1 n 1931 Polan d's population was 65% Catholi c , in 1946 96.6% 
of the natio n was Catholic. 
l59Kolan k iew i cz , Pol an d, 14. 
160Tomasz Miano wic z , "Polish Pope, Polis h Ch u rch , and Pol i sh 
St a te , " Sur v e y , J u ne 198 9, 133. 
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The events which brought Gomu 1 ka back to power a 1 so 
affected the relationship between the Party and the Church. 
The emergence of a "nation a 1" road to soc i a 1 ism in Po 1 and 
contributed to a Catholic parliamentary group's membership in 
the Sejm. Po 1 and became the "testing-ground" for the 
Vatican's relationships with Communism 1n general. 161 In 
Poland the Church gradually wi t hdrew from politics , except for 
areas dealing specifically wi t h the maintenance of religious 
and pastoral missions claimed by the Church. 162 
The selectio n in October 1978 of Polish Car dinal Karol 
Wojtyla as th e new Pope and the birth of Solidarity 1n Aug us t 
1980 changed the relationship between the Catholi c Church in 
Poland and the Pol ish government. The Church has acted as a 
med iator betwee n the trade un i on and the governme nt in their 
ongoing disp ut es. With t he su ppression of Solidar i ty in 1981 
the Chur ch enjoyed an unprec edented rise in po pu la rity and the 
strengthening of its posit i on relative to t he state's 
autho r it y ; churc hes were packed with the fait hful searching 
for an alternative to the states "psychospher e ." 163 
During the period prior to the June 1989 elections, the 
position of the Church was critical for bot h Sol i darity and 
161Toma sz Mianowicz, "Polish Pope, Polish Church, Polish State," 
133. 
162sa nford, Mili tary Rul e in Poland, 220. 
163Mianowicz , "Poli sh Pope , Polish Church, Polish State," 146-
7. 
7 7 
the PUWP. Newl y r e-legalized, Solidarity did not have the 
organization bureaucracy required to susta in a political 
campaign, especia l ly when the elections were held only months 
after Solidarity was officially recognized. The state was 
counting on the Church remaining at least neutral before the 
election and act i ve participation on behalf of Solidarity 
wou 1 d not be a commonp 1 ace occurrence. 164 However, active 
supporters in local parishes greatly assisted Solidarity. In 
turn, this support helped the Church gain a st r onger position 
65 for dealing with the new government. 
With the restoration of full legal status to the Chur ch 
in May 1989, religious education returned to Poland's national 
school system, end in g the separation of Church a n d State began 
during the 1950s.166 Solidarity historically has used the 
Chu rch ' s spi ri tu a l presence and guidance to justif y its 
decisions. 1~ The election of Tadeusz Mazow i ec ki , a prominent 
Catholic layman, as Prime Minister underscores the influence 
164
" Po 1 i t b u r o R e port P r e s en t e d to 1 3th P 1 en u m , " F B I S - E E U , 3 7 . 
165
"Pol i tburo Report Presented to 13th Plenum," FBI S-EEU, 8 
August 1989, 37. 
166
"Rakowski Addresses Sejm on Church Issues , " FBI S-EEU, 27 
April 1989, 33-8; '"Normalizing' Church-State Relations Discussed," 
FBIS-EEU, 19 Ma y 1989, 38-40; "Church's Legal Position Viewed," 
FBIS-EE U, 12 July 1989, 39-42. 
167clyde Haberman, "Vatican and Poland Restore Relations," New 
York Times, 18 July 1989, 3. 
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of the Church in Poland's pol i tical affairs. ~ The strength 
of the divisive abort i on issue in the June 1989 ele c tions will 
probab 1 y cause tension with the government , fo 11 owing the 
Church's support for pro-abortion Solidarity cand i dates over 
the PZPR's anti-abortion parl i ament candidates . 1 ~ 
As a potential political force in Poland, the Church could 
play amajor role in Poland's future. Public opinion is split 
concerning the Church's role i n future elections: running the 
gamut from those who believe Poland is being de-Ch r istianized 
and the process should be resi s ted using any available means, 
including a Cathol i c pol i tical party; to those who mainta i n 
that there are no specif i c Catholic political i nterests or 
ideo 1 ogy and warn about the danger of "Khomey n i zat ion of 
Po 1 and. " 170 The key point is t hat whatever gover nment is 1 n 
power 1n Po la nd wil 1 fa c e an o r gan i zed i ns ti t ut i o n capab le of 
leading a su st ai ned politi ca l and spiritua l res istan ce to 
policies the Church has not approved. 
F. SOVIET INFLUENCE 
By the early 1980's Eastern Europe was a heavy drain on 
Soviet resource s . Poland's debt-ridden economy, dispirited 
168John Tagliabue, "A Journalist at the Helm," New York Times, 
19 August 1989, 1. 
169 John Tagliabue, "Abortion Issue in Poland Splits the 
Opposition," Ne w York Times, 29 May 1989, 1. 
170
"Daily Analyses Polish Right, Catholic Infl uence," FBIS-
EEU , 4 April 1990, 51. 
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population, and anti -Russian feelings were part of the la r ge 
burden car ri ed by the struggling economy of the USSR. If this 
burden was to be 1 i fted, Gorbachev had to e 1 imi nate the 
popular percept ion in East Bloc nations that meaningful 
political-econom ic reform was possible only with the Soviet 
Union's permiss ion. By allowing a multiparty democratic 
system based on market-oriented economic policies in Poland, 
Gorbachev has app arent 1 y repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine. 171 
Following the inability of the PUWP to form a coalition 
government against Solidarity's opposition, a "Gorbachev 
Doctrine" was reportedly formulated . 172 The doctrine was based 
on the new leadership assuming the agreements inh erited from 
the previ ous government; espec i a 11 y an adherence to "soc i a 1 i st 
principles" and the maintenance of both internal and e xternal 
security capab i 1 ity . 173 With the collapse of the East Germa n 
gov ernment and German unification ant i cipated in the near 
future, events have moved beyond the point where this doctrine 
could be implemented in most of Eastern Eu rope. 
Pola nd is conce r ned about the likely near-te rm reunifica-
tion of Germa ny and possible long-term attempts to alter the 
l?.Bi 11 Keller, "Gorbachev in Finland, Disavows Any Right of 
Regional Intervention," The Collapse of Communism Bernard Gwertzmab 
and Michael T. Kaufman , ed. (New York: New York Times Co., 1990), 
163-6. 
172
" 'Gorbachev Doctrine' for East Europe Reported," FBI S-EEU, 
22 August 1989, 20 . 
173
" 'Go rbachev Doctrine' for East Europe Reported," FBI S-EEU, 
22 August 1989, 20. 
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Oder-Neisse border. Poland de sires a unified Germany to be 
tied to a general European so l ution; not permanently neutral 
or just a member of NAT0. 174 A second border consideration is 
not on 1 y the eastern Po 1 ish-Soviet border, but the border 
between Poland and Lithuania. There are 300,000 ethnic Poles 
living in Lithuania, over eight percent of that Republic's 
population. 175 In the past, Ru s sia, Prussia, and Austria have 
altered their borders on the basis of one nation giving up 
ter ri tory to the other, and being "compensated" at the expense 
of Po lish territory. 
Concession of "independent" Lithuania territor y and a 
guarante e of protecting the Polish border from future Germa n 
demand s could ensure a co ntinu ed Soviet prese nce in Poland. 
On t he other hand, Moscow could secure influence with the new 
German government by supporting any claims to Polan d 's western 
borde r , in return for recognition of the Bal tic States 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. In either case Moscow 
would appear to be able to achieve desired f orei gn policy 
objectives and maintain their security. 
Easte rn Europe in genera 1, and spec if i ca 11 y Po 1 and, cannot 
escape the consequences of changes in the Soviet Union's long-
174
"Mazowiecki Demands Presence at Six-Power Tal ks, " FBIS-EEU, 
16 February 1990, 47. 
175
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term perspective o f the global s ituation. 176 The ke y questio ns 
Poland's l eaders hip must contend with i n the near future are: 
what are the lon g- term prospects for Gorbac he v and how will 
his successo r 's pol ic i e s differ? The USSR has an interest i n 
Poland's future development and would l ik e to see a politi-
ca 11 y stab 1 e ne i ghboring state, friend 1 y t oward Moscow. 177 
Unt i 1 the present a 11 i ances in Europe si gni ficant 1 y move 
toward a securit y system containing a un ite d Germa n super-
power, Poland wil l need a coope r ative relat i onsh i p wi th t he 
US SR. l?S 
Po land ' s governme nt must co nte nd with a very we ak economy 
and a lmost unlimited deman ds o n meage r f in a nc ial resource s in 
t he ne ar f utur e . The Sov i et Un io n woul d be a valuabl e a l ly 
for Poland if i t all owed Wars aw to min imize mili t ary spe nd ing 
a nd increase t he e xpend i t ure s o n r ef orm pro grams. A 
politically hos t il e Soviet Uni on co ul d f orce Pol a nd t o s pend 
more money on defen s e a nd jeopar d i z e the possibi 1 ity o f 
a c hie ving l on g-term eco nomi c stab il it y a nd / o r po li t ical 
democr at izati o n . Thus, Po la nd ma y ha ve to keep th e USSR at 
1 e ast ne utra 1 , pr ef erab 1 y support i ve, towa r d i nterna 1 programs 
176 11 So v i et Gen e ral : Forces Defending Soviet Interests I 11 FBIS-
EEU1 16 Ap r il 1 9901 52 - 3. 
177
" USSR Mainly Wa nts 'Stable,' 'F r ie ndl y ' Po l an d , " FB IS-EEU, 20. 
178 11 Skubi s z ewski on Futu r e Ti es Wit h US SR 1 11 FBI S-EEU I 19 January 
1990 1 9-10. 
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to have a reasonable chance for successfully implementing the 
reform program. 
G. JAPANESE/EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES 
1. Japan 
One of the first acts taken by Solidarity was to call 
for Japan to extend its offici a 1 deve 1 opment assistance to 
Poland. 179 Warsaw 1s hoping to combine its human resources 
with Tokyo's economic leadership to build bilateral economic 
r e 1 at i on s . 180 Surprised by the sudden transformation within 
the East Bloc nations, Japan has been slow to respond to the 
calls for financial aid. 
The domestic political problems of the Liberal 
Democratic Party in Japan during 1989-90 have prevented the 
goy ernment from devot in g the time and resources needed to 
produce an investment and development plan for Eastern 
Europe. 181 Japan's business corporations have followed the 
governments lead and are waiting before risking capital in 
Poland's economy . 182 Lacking a long term interest in Eastern 
179
"Poland Requests Overseas Development Loan," FBIS-EEU, 1 
September 1989, 57 . 
180
"Mazowi ecki on Ref arm, Economic Ties with Japan," FBI S-EEU, 
Annex, 19 January 1990, 7. 
181Brian Bridges, "Japan: Business s Usual?," The World Today, 
Apr i 1 1 9 9 0 , 58- 6 1 . 
182Karol J. Szyndziel orz, "The Drama of Peaceful Change in 
Poland," Japan Quarterly, January-March 1990, 104. 
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Europe, Japan w i 11 pr obably not be a major f ac tor in 
determining the outcome of events in the region. This could 
change if the European Economic Community is ab 1 e to 1 ower 
the trade barriers between nations as planned i n 1992; Japa n 
might have to invest in Eastern Europe companies to ensure 
access to We s t Eur ope ' s markets. 
2. West Germany 
The future of a n independent Polish state, as 1n the 
past, is strongly dependent on Germany's po siti o n in Europe. 
Economi cal ly powerful, a German state with te r ritorial 
ambit ions in Euro pe is a distinct threat t o Poland 's survi val . 
Since 177 2 , a German state has pa r tic i pated in , or instigated 
a partition of Poland on four separate o cc asions. The 
hesitation of Germa ny's Chancellor Kohl to guaran t ee Pola nd 's 
border immediately f ollowing the f a ll of the Berlin Wal 1 has 
r e kindled Poland's fear of a unified Germa ny as a neighbor. 
Not surpr isingly, two out of every three Po les surveyed 
in earl y 1990 we re oppos e d to the reun i fica t ion of Germany 
be cause it wo uld be destabilizing. 183 
Po l a nd has demanded to be represented at a ny 
discussions between the two German states a nd the post-war 
183Alan Riding, "Survey Finds 2 in 3 Poles Opposed to German 
Unity," New Yo rk Times, 20 February 1990, 8. 
84 
o c c u p y i n g powe r s con c e r n i n g t h e s e c u r i t y of Po 1 a n d . 184 Both 
General Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Mazowie cki have called 
for the Soviet troops to remain in Po 1 and unt i 1 a treaty 
providing "adequate" assurances against any possible future 
German aggression has been signed. Tension over the border 
question will remain, even if a treaty is signed guaranteeing 
the border . It will take time and a prolonged demonstration 
of non-aggression for a unified Germany to sooth the fears of 
its neighbors, especially in Poland. 185 
Conce rn ed about reunification and solving the economic 
prob 1 ems 1 n East German y, West Germany ma y not ha v e the 
resource s to s imu 1 taneou s 1 y provide support for Po 1 a n d. 186 1 n 
the We s t, economists fear the rush to reunify will cause 
inflatio n and higher global interest rates as Western capital 
i s diverte d to East Germa ny . 187 Hi stor i ca 1 tie s and Hu n gary's 
stronger economy wi 11 probably lead to Ger man foreign aid 
~ 84 "Ma z owi ecki Demands Presence at Six- Powe r Talks, " FB I S- EEU, 
16 February 1990, 47. 
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of a German 
going to Budapest before Warsaw. 188 If e i ther condition 
occurs, Poland's drive for econom1c recovery will be 
handicapped by extern a 1 forces beyond Warsaw's direct contro 1 . 
Faced with the immense expense of unification and 
historical caution concerning German motives in Poland, Bonn 
will probably be willing to let the United States take the 
leading role in Po l and for the next ten years. With the U.S. 
supporting Warsaw's economic recovery, Germany will not have 
to actively counte r progress made by an European neighbo r in 
Poland. Conceivable Bonn could encourage American 
participat i on unt i l the time when reunification is complete, 
and Ge rmany is in a position to e xpand its economic interests 
into a region devoid of direct European competition. 
3 . Great Britain 
I mm e d i at e 1 y f o 1 1 ow i n g t h e e 1 e c t i on s i n June , London 
gave Warsaw a $4 2 million aid package to train managers and 
help establi sh a market economy. 189 With only a relatively 
small portion of Po land's foreign debt owed to British banks, 
the Thatcher gove r nment has taken a "benign" stance on debt 
reschedu 1 i ng. 190 The August formation of a Solidarity-led 
188
"Text of Koh l' s 22 Nov Strasbourg Speech," FBIS-WEU, 20 
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government resulted in the Bri t ish government cont r ibuting an 
additional $175 million to Poland and calling for the Western 
nations to put forth a larger effort to help the new 
government. 191 
Margaret Thatcher's go v ernment has ca 1 1 ed for a treaty 
guaranteeing Poland's borders and allowing the changes taking 
place in Eastern Europe to proceed against a bac kground of 
stability and security _192 Wi t h a moderately strong economy, 
British businessman wil 1 be looking to the emerging states in 
East Europe as potentia 1 investment opportunitie s . With a 
historical tradition of being able to cooperate , the United 
States and Great Britain should be able to coord i nate their 
policies and shar e the burden of attaining mutually supportive 
objectives. 
4. France 
President Mitterrand agreed to reschedule Poland's $1 
bi 11 ion foreign debt held by France and delay all payments 
unt i 1 1993 in response to the June 1989 elections. 193 
191Andrew McEwen, "Thatcher Se eks More Western Aid for Warsaw," 
London Times, 7 September 1989, 10; Tom Giles, "Walesa Woos 
Investors on First Visit to Britain," London Times , 30 November 
1989, 7. 
192
"Thatcher, Shevardnadze Comment on 19 Dec Talks," FBIS-WEU, 
20 December 1990, 4; "Thatcher Explains Vision of Europe; Kohl 
Answers," FBIS-WEU, 30 March 1990 , 8-9. 
193L d . on on T1mes, 16 June 198 9 , 9 . 
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Realizing Germany would be the ma1n economic power capable of 
providing financial support for Eastern Europe before the fall 
of the Berlin Wal l , France wanted to mobilize all Europeans 
to form a policy for the East Bloc that was common to all of 
the European countries. 1" In line with this policy, France's 
financial assistance is via EEC channels and not in direct 
government-to-government loans. Although the government has 
urged business to invest in Eastern Europe, bankers are 
skeptical, uncertain about the security, stability, and 
economic success of investments. 195 
Concerned about the prospects of a united Germany 1n 
Europe and the negative effect it would have on French 
influence, Mitterrand's foreign policy toward Eastern Europe 
is a n attemp t to consolidate European action into a single 
plan for all the nations. This policy is jeopar dized by a 
reluctance of the poorer EEC nations to spend money in Eastern 
Europe when their economies are present 1 y very weak. 196 Paris 
does not have the resources to support Poland in the East, and 
194
"oefense Minister Discusses East Europe Situation," 
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195
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196sally Jacobsen, "European Community: Gains Risks," San 
Jose Mercury News, 20 February 1990, 1E. 
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confront Germany in the West. Paris is probably willing, if 
not an x ious, to see the U.S. lead the effort in Poland, rather 
than 1 eave the opportunity for a united Germany to expand 
later. 
H. THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
Poland is at a cross-road of political and social evolu-
tion. Popular discontent forced the PUWP to repudiate their 
constitutional monopoly on political powe r. The new govern-
ment has to overcome political as well as economic problems 
resulting from the 40 years of Communist rule, before the 
reforms can be judged successf u l and perhaps more i mportantly 
non-reversible. Numerous programs could emerge in the near 
future an d fractionalize the government. Witho ut a strong 
government, politically difficu lt choices cannot be mad e, a nd 
the present problems will probably not be overcome. 
Before the America can implement any long-term policies 
to achieve its national i nterests in the area, Wash i ngton must 
understand the probability of possible future eve nts. Once 
Poland's likely political alternatives are known, given the 
present international situation, issues that can be affected 
by American pol icy can be isolated. Than a po 1 i cy can be 
developed around a framework of issues specifically selected 
based on achieving America's national objectives in Poland at 
a minimum cost while ma xim izing th e probabil i t y fo r success. 
The following section outli nes three possible political 
scenar ios in Po land's duri ng t h e ne xt ten years. 
89 
33. 
1. Political Instability 
This scenario assumes the Po 1 ish government cannot 
implement a reform program with the associated social 
discontent and de -h abilitating political consequences. The 
main danger is th a t the population's patience for solutions 
to long-standing problems will run out long before the 
anticipate d benefits are delivered. In this scenario, a 
deeply divided central government is unable to maintain the 
support required to carry out its polit i cal platform. 
Economic and pol i tical collapse appears imminent as the 
governme nt 1s paralyzed by an inability to generate a 
consensus and take action. Either a military coup overthrows 
the elected officials and establishes a d ictatorship; or a 
rad ical politica l party emerges to dominate the governme nt. 
This scenario seems plausible whe n it is recog niz ed 
that the roots o f the present situation in Poland are buried 
in the failure of a socialist model that exhausted the 
development poss i bi lities before abdicating power. ~~ Gen uine 
trans for mation o f the economy and a mobilization of people's 
social energ y will be essential to surmount the present crisis 
s it u a t i on . 198 M a i n t a i n i n g the pub 1 i c ' s con f i den c e r e q u i res a 
197
"Politburo Report to 13th Plenum," FBIS -EEU , 8 August 1989, 
198
"Mazowiecki on Threats to Democratization," FBIS-EEU, 6 
October 1989, 64. 
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social safety net to protect the weak against the effects of 
a free market. 199 
Poland is moving toward democracy while being 1n the 
process of learning about the give and take of Western style 
politics.WO Lech Walesa's willingness to do batt l e with his 
former a 11 i es in the Po 1 ish Cabinet and "have a war that gives 
peace to the bottom of society" could indicate an imminent 
breakup i n So 1 i dar i t y ' s p o 1 i t i c a 1 support . 20 1 W i t h the Po 1 i s h 
far left in disorder, Solidarity is the only politi cal organi -
zation capable of forming a stable government . Witho ut a 
stable government capable of maintaining the suppo r t required 
to allow the political and economic reforms to take root, the 
possibility of a non-democratic system emerging increases. 
President Jaruzelski controls the army , police, and 
the power to impos e or lighten censorship. His threat to use 
the military t o quell any destabiliz ing events i n February 
1989 and the imposition of martial law 1n December 1981, 
demonstrate a wi 11 ingness t o use force to prevent a complete 
199
"Geremek Views Polish Democratization," FBIS-EEU, 31 January 
1990, 48. 
200 serge Schmemann, "New Rules in Warsaw: The Politics of 
Paradox," New York Times, 16 July 1989, 14. 
20 \" 
· Ready to Fight, Walesa Tells Solida rity Panel," New York 
Times, 14 May 1990, 6. 
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collapse of political control in Poland .202 If the army 
remains united behind Jaruze 1 ski's 1 eadersh i p, the use of 
military forces in a coup is one possible solution to a loss 
of political control i nherent is this scenario. It is worth 
reca l ling that Mar shal Pilsudski was able to use strife and 
political ana r ch y to install a dictatorship in 1926. 
A wea k go vernment and poor economic performance could 
prov i de the basis for an alternative outcome: a "dictatorsh ip 
of the people . " 
faith 1n the 
In ternal conditions wea ken the population's 
government 's abi 1 ity to cope with domestic 
prob l ems . The military, reflecting society's e xtreme 
disaffection, i s incapable of taking decisive action to 
prevent the country from s 1 i ding further toward anarchy. 
Voters become d i senchanted with the major political groups, 
allowing radical parties to gain e lectoral strength. 
Eventua 11 y one e xtremist party contro 1 s the governme nt , and 
solidifies its control using the state's legal institutions. 
Due to t he factionalism 1n the political left 1n 
Poland following the breakup of the PUWP, this scenario is 
more likely to develop into a right wing dictatorship. 
Howe ver , if the communists are ab 1 e to take advantage of a 
split in the right and center elements of Solidarity and 
regain widespread popular support, than a left wing government 
could come to power. Nevertheless, during the next ten years, 
202 London Times , 1 March 1989, 11. 
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without e x tensive externa 1 su p port, the rad i ca 1 1 eft is not 
1 ike 1 y to overcome the popu 1 at ion's memory of the 1 ast 40 
years and regain control of the government. 
This scenario, virt u ally a fascist alternative 
government, becomes creditable when it is recalled that almost 
everyone in Poland has already had to make sacrifices because 
of the economic changes under way, but most e x pect thei r 
condition to improve in the near future. 203 With the co 1 1 apse 
of the So viet economy and ne w go v ernments throughout the 
Ea s tern Bloc, Poland can cou nt o n economic competitio n , not 
support, from its former CME A tradi ng pa rtners. Economic 
succes s in the near term is no t guaranteed . 
The present governmen t must fight attack s from the 
right witho u t the balancing fa c tor of a strong political lef t. 
I f t his sit uat ion continues, Poland co u ld be retu rn ed to the 
pol itical doldr ums caused by having one all powe r fu l poli tica l 
party or a m i 1 i t ar y d i c tat or s h i p . 204 While this situation 
mi ght pr ovi d e stability in Poland for the short-term, it would 
not in th e long-term provide for an orderly transfe r of 
polit i cal power . Hence, sometime in the future a n internal 
power struggle a nd a possible return to anarchy. 
203
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2. Limited Democratic Success 
This scenario assumes some economic a nd po 1 i t i cal 
reforms are successfully implemented, but rising social 
discontent forces the government to repudiate essential parts 
of the reform package. The country's economic co 11 apse is 
stopped, but 1 itt 1 e progress is made toward actua 11 y improving 
the people's standard of living. The safety net required to 
ensure a stab le government prevents a complete alteratio n in 
the political system established under the PUWP. The 
government begins t o postpone implementing add itiona l reforms. 
A d ic tato rship is no t formed, but the gove rnment avoids di r ect 
acco untabili ty to the voters by failing to implement 
political, as we l 1 as economi c reform. 
Today, initial indications suggests risin g unemploy-
ment is a major social concern. By the end of January 1990 
there we re 55,800 officially registered j ob seekers; the 
Pol i sh governmen t estimates by December 1990 400,000 will be 
unemployed, ominously, the World Bank estimates as many as 1 
m i 1 1 i on w i 1 1 be job 1 e s s . 205 Farmers are h a v i n g an u n p 1 e as ant 
first e xperience with capitalism; over-production of potatoes 
has sharply reduced prices. A state monopoly on food distri-
butors keep's food prices low and uncontrolled prices on farm 
205
"Problem of Unemployment Examined; Data Cited, " FB I S-EEU 16 
February 1990, 55-6. 
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necessities is bankrupting most sma 1 1 farmers. 206 
calling for official action to help the farmer.207 
Many are 
There are numerous governments in the wor 1 d today that 
call themselves "democratic," many are significantly different 
in both form and substance from the American model. In Poland 
a pol itical revolution has begun, but reserving seats in 
parliament for the PUWP prevents the government from reflect-
ing the actual strength of the different political parties. 
The Solidarity government has acknowledged that political 
restructuring of the state must be a priority and that at any 
moment "democracy" might co 11 apse if the economy does not 
reco v er. 208 Reform ma y be d e layed because of " fear " that 
Poland could not afford additional "democracy . " 209 
Of note, Lech Wa 1 esa has pushed for a pa use in the 
implementation of democrac y s o authoritie s ca n re-establ ish 
206 rn th e 1 ong-run this may prove beneficial, as the smal l farms 
are replaced by more efficient larger farms. In the short-term low 
prices for potatoes, a staple of the Polish diet, ma y allow th e 
government more time to solve the economic problem by sat is fying 
the dema n ds of the urban workers for "reasonable" food prices . 
207 Stephen Eng e 1 berg , "G 1 u t of Potatoes i n Po 1 and i s Show i n g 
the Price of Change to Free Market," New Yor k Times, 15 Ma y 1990, 
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21n 
econom1c order. '" Forty years of living in a socialist system 
has established a belief t hat the government ought to provide 
a cushion aga in st an individual's hard times. 211 Already there 
is recognition in some parts of Solidarity's leadership that 
the pace of economi c change is running ahead of what the 
public will tolerate.212 To foresee all the p robl e ms created 
by the reforms was an imposs i b 1 e task, but Warsaw must be 
careful in beg i nn in g to alter the reform program. 
3 . Democrati c Government Succeeds 
Thi s scenario is based on the ab ility of the Polish 
government t o overcome the present econom ic difficulties. A 
rising standard of 1 iving wi 11 allow al 1 of the political 
part ies time t o establish firm roots in the ge neral 
population , creat i ng the t ru st and confidence required for a 
pluralistic democracy. The tw in dangers of time and 
impatie n ce a r e over come by tangible results before an 
e x plosion of despe r ation occurs.213 
2l0Mort Rosenblum, "Rebuilding After Wa lls Come Down," San Jose 
Mercury News, 18 February 1990, 1-2E. 
2, 1 
--"LE MONDE Interviews Mazowiecki on Plans," FBIS-EEU, 28 
August 1989, 36. 
212steven Greenhouse, "Slow Pace for Reform in East Bloc," New 
York Time s, 29 January 1990, 1C. 
m "Mazowie cki on Threats to Democrat ization, " FBIS-EEU, 6 
October 198 9, 64. 
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In this scenario, the SDRP adapts to democracy and 
forms a viable alternative to the right wing elements of the 
Solidarity coalition government. Solidarity evolves from a 
broad based trade union opposed to further communist rule, 
into valid political parties reflecting popular aspirations. 
The military high command is fully de-politicized and 
answerable to the President, becoming an institution to 
counter external, not internal threats, to the civilian 
1 eadersh i p' s authority. 214 
This alternative does not necessarily imply econom1c 
prosperity, only a minimum standard of living to prevent the 
radical political elements from forming a credible platform 
and causing internal instabil i ty in Poland. The government 
is accountable to the population on major issues, preventing 
individuals from isolating their political power from society. 
I. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The three political scenar ios presented and the issues 
analyzed will now be used to generate a hierarchy of possible 
developments within the Pol ish political arena. Each question 
was evaluated to determine its likely contribution to 
achieving the individual scenarios. 
214
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97 
1. Communist Impact 
The rapid breakup of the PUWP into splinter parties 
with almost identi c al platforms demonstrates an unwillingness 
to accept the J une e 1 ect ion defeat by part s of the upper 
leadership. Without a relatively strong left wing, a 
democracy will be dominated by the right and could be unstable 
over the long term . If the communist party can reform into 
a viable oppos i tion they will be most effect iv e as a minority 
party in a ful l democracy. A limited democracy is the wo r st 
case for a minor i t y party; the party wi l l pro babl y be b l ame d 
for any failure of government policy due to a lac k of their 
suppo r t a nd wi l l not rece i ve credit for successful prog r ams 
resulting from the i r parties platform . 
2. Democratic Costs 
The soci al a nd econom i c cos ts of e s t a b li s hing a 
democracy a re steep a nd there i s little indicat i on that t he 
Polish people wil l be wi lling to endure the austerity program 
req u i r ed to estab li s h th e reform program alre a dy implemented. 
The e ndu r ance o f Po lish opposition to t he communist s ys tem, 
represented in pa r t by Solidar ity's path to successful change, 
is an indication that the nation is wi 11 ing to make some 
sacrifices to fo r ge a democracy. Po 1 and's poor po 1 it i ca 1 
de velopment betwe en the wars combined wi th a poor perfo r mance 
relative to the o t her East Bloc nations, were the deciding 
facto r s in ma k ing instability more likely tha n full democ r acy . 
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3 . Catholic Church 
The Catholic Church as a conservative institution 
strugg 1 es to prevent the 
unstable. If it has to 
country from becoming po 1 it i ca 1 1 y 
the Church w i 11 deve 1 op into an 
opposition movement against a dictatorship that does not 
protect the rights of society, as it did under communist rule. 
A full democracy in Poland could weaken the Church's influence 
in internal affairs, or force the Church to give up some of 
it s privileges and power; neither situation would be 
acceptab 1 e t o the Church's 1 eadersh i p. Th e most des i rab 1 e 
pos i tio n fo r the Church wo u 1 d be a 1 imi ted democracy that 
valued human rights , but did not interf ere with t he Church's 
special positi on in Polish society. 
4. Soviet Influence 
The Soviet Union does not want a n unstabl e regi me as 
a nei ghb or any mor e than the United States would . In a period 
of in ternal unre st in the USSR Gorbache v doe s not want Poland 
to sink into anarchy, providing his opposition with an e xample 
of the path along which the Soviet reforms mi ght be heading. 
It is not likely that the USSR could get the majo ri ty of the 
Polish voters in a full democracy to embrace policies that are 
perceived as g iving Moscow influence in Poland's internal 
affairs. A lim i ted democracy would allow Sov iet leaders the 
opportunity on 1 y to have to coopt a sma 11 port i on of the 
Polish national leadership to achieve influence over Pola nd 's 
internal affairs . 
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5. Japan/Europe 
The Japanese and European nations do not want to see 
Poland degenerate into an unstable situation because it could 
jeopardize polit ical reforms occurring in other East Bloc 
nations. Moreove r, an unstable Poland would not be a very 
reliable market, and could not provide the return on 
investment required for business investment or guarantee a 
repayment of the already substantial foreign debt run up by 
the communists. A ful 1 democracy wou l d allow Western 
governments to max i mize their political influence by ensuring 
domestic support f or the Polish government . A limited 
democracy would ru n the risk of being perceived as a trick on 
the Soviets part t o get Western credits and technol ogy without 
having to implement "real" political reform . 
J. CONCLUSION 
The most likely scenario under current conditions is for 
Poland to evol ve in to a limited democrac y wit h a right wing 
orientation. The 1 eft wing w i 11 be unab 1 e to prevent the 
r i g h t w i n g 1 e ad e r s h i p from t a k i n g steps to restore " soc i a 1 
order" which will cost the Polish people some of their 
political rights. The Soviet Union and Catho lic Church will 
press for this opti on to maximize the potent ial to influence 
the nations develo pment along their preferred lines. Finally, 
the extreme cost o f a full democracy is probably more than the 
Polish people can presently tolerate. The probability of an 
unstable politica l environment i s a distant third, allowing 
100 
the West to continue to provi d e the present level of support 
without having to e xpect the worst case developin g . 
1 0 1 
VI. CONCLUSION and POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding five chapters have provided an analysis of 
Poland's historical, economic, political, and mi 1 itary 
deve 1 opment to provide the foundation for American foreign 
policy in Poland . Each of the chapters of analysis presented 
three possible scenarios, for a total of 27 different 
plausible outcome s for Poland in the next te n years when the 
areas are evaluated simultaneously. 215 The most critical issue 
for determining the most likely future for Poland in the 
coming decade is t he economy's performance, followed by the 
political and than the military issues. 
Using the ana l ysis of the earlier chapte r s and the above 
weighing factor the three most likely scenarios are listed in 
Table 4 with the most likely listed first . 
215Each of the three economic scenarios has three different 
military possibilities and each of the military scenarios has three 
political possibil i ties. Combining all of the possible mutations 
generates 3 (economic scenarios) X 3 (military scenarios) X 3 
(political scenarios ) = 27 possible alternatives. 
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TAB LE 4: 
OPTIONS FOR POLAND'S FUTURE 
1. Economic Equilibrium, Military Alliance wit h t he USSR, and 
Limited democratic Success. 
2. Economic Equilibrium, Militarily Neutral, and Li mited 
Democratic Success. 
3. Economic Equilibrium, Military Alliance with the USSR, 
and Democratic Government Succeeds. 
An y enduring success wi l l be achieved by cor relating 
is s ues to thei r genesis , an d than attempting t o solve the 
causes and not the symptoms of the problem . Th e following 
recommendations, while broken down into the topics of analysis 
us e d in the ear 1 i er chapte r s, have been deve 1 oped wh i 1 e 
cons ide r in g the potential impact on the othe r area s of 
ana l ysis. 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Economi c 
The common de nominato r o f t he t hree most li kely 
s c ena r ios i s f or Pola nd 's e conomy to ma i nt a i n i t s current 
level of performance while shifting to a free market. The 
d i s r up t i on s caused by the free mar ket system w i 1 1 counter -
balance the positive effects from discarding th e centrally 
planned economy . With the po pulation expecting a n immediate 
improveme nt in their living conditions followi ng the change 
i n go v er nme nt i n August, Poland has the pote nti al to be very 
unstable in the near-term. 
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The present international environment will not allow 
Poland to receive all of the economic assistance required to 
quickly overcome the dehabilitating effect of 45 years 
practicing Soviet economic theory. As the first country to 
replace their commun ist government Poland is the furthest down 
the path of implementing economic reform of the former Eastern 
Bloc nations. A failure in Poland could have a domino effect 
on the efforts to reform all of the centrally planned 
econom i es by given those elements opposing economic changes 
a showcase of where the reforms are heading . 
The United States 1s in a pos it ion to drastically 
influence and direct Poland's near term economic future. With 
only a moderate increase in the present amount of financial 
assistance to Poland, the United States might be able to give 
the Polish economy enough of a boost to allow it to overcome 
the prob 1 ems of converting to a free mar ke t system. 
estimate that Poland will require $750 million a year, above 
the a 1 r e ad y a 1 1 ott e d pro g r am s , for t h e next ten y ear s i n 
f i nanc i a 1 assistanc e. 21 6 
E con om i c ass i stance , e i the r pub 1 i c or p r i vat e , can 
alleviate the negative conditions presently in Poland. With 
the current national budget restrictions in Washington, it is 
not 1 i k e 1 y the Fe der a 1 government can pro v i de the b u 1 k of 
216My estimate is based on the public statements of the Polish 
political leaders, both before and after the June 1989 elections, 





Poland's economic requirements. Changes in the tax structure 
can be used to provide the economic incentive for business 
firms to investment private f unds and surmount a shortage in 
public funding. 
A second option is fo r the United States to concen-
trate almost all of its foreign assistance for Eastern Europe 
into a single country, i.e., Poland. If the limited American 
resources are spread evenly th r oughout the region, it will be 
insignificant in comparison to the problems, and fail to 
a c h i eve Am e r i can go a 1 s i n t he reg i on . Washingto n cannot 
afford to spend 1 i m i ted resources without maximizing the 
potential future benefits, while simultaneously minimizing 
the costs. 
America is in an uniq ue position to direct and shape 
Po land's future, and hence, achieve U.S. nationa l interests 
in the region at an affordable cost. As Lech Walesa pointed 
out in a speech to Congress: 
. people in Poland link the name of the Un i ted States 
with freedom and democracy, with generosity and hign-
mindedness, with human friendship and friendly humanity. 7 
If Poland can be successfully rejuvenated it will serve as a 
potentially strong and stable ally for the United States in 
a generally unstable part of the globe. The territorial size, 
strategic position, population strength, and cultural ties to 
the U.S . make Poland the most likely nation in Eastern Europe 
217Lech Wal esa, "Pol and," Vi t a l Speeches, 15 December 1988, 132. 
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to have similar in terests in the region. I t would greatly 
enhance U.S. national interests to promote stability in 
Eastern Europe by economi call y assisting Pol and during the 
next decade. 
2. Military 
A militar y alliance with the Soviet Union 1s probable 
in two of the three predicated scenarios for Poland. This is 
not acceptable to the United States because it would allow the 
Soviets to mainta i n a strong influence in Poland . The two 
major reasons for Warsaw to continue participating in a Warsaw 
Pact alliance are a military threat from a resurgent Germany 
and the financial cost of shifting into a Western military 
a l l i ance. 
conditions . 
The U.S. is in a position to influence both 
Since one scenario already predicts a neutral 
Poland, the chan c e s for preventing anAl lianc e with the USSR 
are possib l e e ve n witho ut American actio n . 
In the coming decade it is reasonable to expect the 
American defense budget to contract if the perceived Soviet 
th r eat continu e s to dim i nish. A general troop draw dow n in 
Europe will g i ve Washington a supply of redundant military 
equipment to be d i sposed. Reducing the costs of Pol and 
shifting away f rom Soviet equipment supplies can be 
accomplished cheaply by giving or leasing Po l and surplus U.S. 
equipment. Arm t r ansfers may enhance the preparedness of a 




leadership of the Church or USSR . Nevertheless as a 
diplomatic, not economic policy, this option could conceivably 
be cheaper to achieve in the long run than foreign aid. 
B. CONCLUSION 
One of the goals of this thesis was to determine if Poland 
had the potential to establish a full democracy with a free 
market with limited U.S. assistance. The research and 
analysis presented here suggests that it is realistically 
possible to achieve this objective. Similar studies on 
alternative East Bloc nations should be undertake n to ensure 
the United States selects the country offering the highest 
probability of success with the minimum expenditure of 
American resources. 
It is c r itical to acknowledge that the e xpansion of 
freedom and democracy might be illusory if Poland remains 
povert y stric ken. 22 1 A failu r e in Poland, the leader of the 
Eastern Bloc's movement towards political freedom, might cause 
a rippling effect throughout the region. Democracy may be 
impossible to achieve with small measured steps, requiring an 
abrupt break with the past system to be successfully reached. 
If the United States' objective of establishing democracies 
throughout Eastern Europe is to be reached a well defined and 
completely thought out policy must be implemented. 
221
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Only the United States is strong enough and does not carry 
the historica l baggage of abandoning Poland during Warsaw's 
time of greatest need. The hi stor i ca 1 1 egacy 1 eft by the 
massive Polish em i gration to the United States around the turn 
of the twent ieth century has created a strong emotion a 1 
attachment between the two nations. With a Polish minority 
of almost nine mil l ion, the United States is in a position to 
develop strong ties with the new Solidarity led Polish 
government. 
This anal y sis indicates the historical development of 
Poland has c r eated an economic, military, and political 
environment t h at could support an American policy of 
decreasing Sov iet influence in the region. However, any 
pol icy implemented wi 11 have to be sensi tiv e to Pol ish 
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